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Capital City Bank ("Capital City" ) , by and through its 
counsel, Watkiss & Campbell, submits 
to the appeal from a partial final 
foreclosure filed by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael 
Landes, Plaintiffs, Counterclaim Defendants, and Appellants 
("Appellants"). 
this brief in response 
judgment and decree of 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has app4 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
July 23, 1987, the Utah Supreme Cou; 
to the Utah Court of Appeals for d 
the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisc 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (191 
OF APPEALS 
Hate jurisdiction over 
§78-2-2 (1987). On 
t poured-over this case 
sposition. Accordingly, 
iction over this appeal 
7) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Respondent since there was no genuine 
issue of material fact and whether Capital City was entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law? 
2. Whether the district court I properly concluded that 
the SBA was not an indispensable party to this action? 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This proceeding before the Utah 
appeal by Plaintiffs from a memorandum decision and partial 
final judgment and decree of foreclos 
Court of Appeals is an 
ure entered in the Third 
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Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, The judgment 
appealed from granted summary judgment in favor of Capital 
City dismissing all claims in the complaint filed against Capital 
City, R. 501, 5 13, and further granting judgment against 
Appellants and in favor of Capital City on the counterclaim 
in the amount of $293,319.64 plus interest after February 15, 
1987, at 11 3/4% per annum compounded annually, R. 498, 5 2, 
and ordering foreclosure of the mortgages held by Capital City 
on the Appellants1 real property. it is these decisions from 
which Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal. R. 405-406; 
498, I 4; 499, f 6; 500, fl 8. 
The district court also declared that Capital City's 
mortgages on the Appellants1 real properties are superior to 
any liens claimed by the other Counterclaim Defendants: Utah 
State Tax Commission, Crossroad Plaza Associates, Young Electric 
Sign Company, and Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., from 
which no appeal has been taken. R. 499, 55 and 7; 5 501, 5 10. 
The district court specifically reserved the issues relative 
to the award and proper amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded 
to Capital City. R. 501, 5 14. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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or 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
about December 24, 1979, Bagel Nosh 1. On 
Intermountain, Ltd., a New York corporation (hereinafter "Bagel 
Nosh"), executed a Note (hereinafter "note") in favor of Capital 
, which note was executes 
Bagel Nosh. R. 3, 5 5; 
1 Business Administration 
the United States, is 
City in the principal sum of $300,000.00 
by Sidney Seftel as Vice-President of 
R. 25, f 5. 
2. As explicitly stated, the no^e was executed by Bagel 
Nosh to secure a loan in which the Smal 
(hereinafter "SBA"), an agency of 
participating. R. 14. 
3. Appellants were the officers!, directors, and owners 
of Bagel Nosh. R. 107-115, 128. 
4. On even date with the note,| Arpellants executed two 
absolute, unconditional, personal guaranties of the note in 
favor of Capital City. R. 20-21. 
5. On even date with the guaranties, Appellants executed 
two trust deeds in favor of Capital Cipy as collateral security 
for their guaranties. R. 37-39, 41^43. 
6. The guaranties explicitly grarjt: 
[T]o Lender . . . the due and puhctual payment when 
due, whether by acceleration or otherwise . . . of 
the principal of and interest | on and all sums 
payable . . . with respect to the note of the 
Debtor . . . . 
* * * * * 
[Gjrants to Lender full power, 
discretion and without notice . 
in its uncontrolled 
. . to deal in any 
k29 
manner with the liabilities and the collateral/ 
including . . . [plower: 
(a) To modify or otherwise change any terms of all 
or any part of the liabilities or the rate of 
interest thereon . . . to grant any extension 
or renewal thereof . . . and to effect any 
release, compromise, or settlement with respect 
thereto: 
* * * * * 
(d) To consent to the substitution, exchange, or 
release of all or any part of the 
collateral . . . . 
* * * * * 
The obligations of the [Plaintiffs] hereunder shall 
not be released, discharged, or in any way affected, 
nor shall the [Plaintiffs] have any rights or recourse 
against Lender, by reason of any action Lender may 
take or omit to take under the foregoing powers, 
(emphasis added). 
R. 20-21. 
7. On or about March 30, 1983, Bag^l Nosh, Capital City, 
and the SBA entered into a Loan Restructure Agreement modifying 
the terms of the note. R. 44-45. 
8. The Loan Restructure Agreement was signed by one 
of the Appellants and provided for: (a) curing the existing 
default in payments on the note; (b) payment of a minimal amount 
on the principal indebtedness; (c) Bagel Nosh to submit monthly 
financial statements; (d) personal financial statements of 
Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes to be submitted; (e) a 
reduction in monthly payments from $5,557.50 per month to 
$4,000.00 per month; and (f) a reduction in the interest rate 
charged by one-half of one percent. R. 44-45. 
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their complaint/ during 
9. Bagel Nosh filed a voluntary! petition under Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code on November] 29, 1984. R. 5, 5 11; 
R. 25, 5 11. 
10. As alleged by Appellants in 
the pendancy of the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy proceeding, Appellants, 
"as Guarantors," have been making monthly payments in the reduced 
amount on the note in favor of Capital 
the provisions of the Loan Restructure! 
and R. 25, 5 14. 
11. At all times relevant to thli 
has maintained and still maintains a perl 
pursuant to Article 9 of the Utah Unp 
Secured Transactions, in all equipmenft 
personal property of Bagel Nosh, 
12. No authorized officer of Capjj 
charged with the responsibility for 
Nosh loan has at any time represented t<b any person that Capital 
City did not have or does not have an interest in the equipment 
of Bagel Nosh. R. 168-184. 
13. On March 11, 1986, Appellants filed a complaint in 
the Third Judicial District Court of |Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, against Capital City asking tjhe court to declare that 
Appellants were discharged from any 
unconditional, personal guaranties. R. 
14. On April 1, 1986, Capital C| 
counterclaim to Appellants1 complaint 
City in accordance with 
Agreement. R. 5, f 14; 
is action, Capital City 
greeted security interest, 
iform Commercial Code -
ft, machinery, and other 
ital City or any person 
administering the Bagel 
obligations under their 
2-21. 
|ity filed an answer and 
The counterclaim asked 
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the court to decree that the Appellants' guaranties and their 
trust deeds were valid obligations of Appellants, jointly and 
severally, and to judicially foreclose the trust deeds. The 
counterclaim also asked the court to declare that the interests 
of the Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroads Plaza Associates, 
Young Electric Sign Company, and Olympus Hills Shopping Center, 
Ltd., in Appellants' real property were inferior to the interests 
of Capital City. R. 24-45. 
15. On April 24, 1986, Appellants served Requests for 
Admissions and Interrogatories on Capital City, R. 65, to which 
Capital City timely responded on May 27, 1986. R. 74. 
16. On July 25, 1986, Capital City filed a motion for 
summary judgment on the issues in th2 complaint and the 
counterclaim and a memorandum of points and authorities in 
support thereof. R. 79-99, 100-102. As part of the record 
including the exhibits to Capital City's memorandum, Capital 
City submitted documentary evidence in accordance with Rule 
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, showing that it was entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law on each and every issue 
before the court. R. 34-45, 80-86, 105-192, 241-243, 250-252, 
and 283. 
17. Accompanying the motion, Capital City filed a Notice 
of Hearing for the motion to be heard before the district court 
on August 11, 1986. R. 194-196. 
18. Appellants requested and were granted a stipulation 
by Capital City to the time in which to respond and to obtain 
k29 
affidavits in opposition to the motion v| 
R. 201-203. 
19- On September 11, 1986, Appell| 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
any supporting documentary evidence or a. 
20. The hearing on the motion f 
continued until October 6, 1986. R. 225 
21. On October 2, 1986, Appellants! 
of the hearing on the motion. R. 227-23 
22. On October 2, 1986, Judge EJ 
court continued the hearing on the mot 
and granted Capital Cxty lease to fi| 
R. 237-238. 
23. On October 3, 1986, Capita] 
memorandum in support of its motion wi 
evidence attached thereto. R. 241-305. 
24. On October 27, 1986, the mot 
heard before the Honorable Timothy R. 
taken under advisement. R. 307. 
25. After legal research and a 
evidence, on February 4, 1987, Third 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson issued a 
summary judgment in favor of Capital 
the complaint and the counterclaim. R. 
26. On May 20, 1987, Judge Hanson| 
judgment and decree of foreclosure s 
ith a continued hearing. 
ants filed a Memorandum 
Summary Judgment without 
fidavits. R. 208-222. 
:>r summary judgment was 
•226. 
moved for a continuance 
0. 
aniels of the district 
on to October 27, 1986, 
le a reply memorandum. 
th 
1 City filed a reply 
additional documentary 
JLon of Capital City was 
Hanson and the matter 
careful review of the 
Judicial District Court 
decision granting 
City on all issues in 
08-313. 
signed a p a r t i a l f i n a l 
let t ing f o r t h the terms 
memorandum 
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of the February 4, 1987 decision and foreclosing the mortgages 
on the real property of the Appellants. R. 378-384. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
The district court did not err in finding that no genuine 
issue of material fact precluded summary judgment, since Capital 
City produced uncontroverted evidence on each and every issue 
before the court. Capital City thus established entitlement: 
to summary judgment as a matter of law. Appellants failed 
to submit any evidence to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact. 
II 
The district court in ruling in favor of Capital City 
correctly applied the law on all substantive issues before 
the court. Capital City established that Appellants admitted 
their liability under the guaranties and waived any claim of 
modification. Furthermore, the record evidences that even 
under state law, which is not the applicable substantive law, 
Capital City would be entitled to prevail. 
Ill 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding 
that the SBA was not an indispensable party. The Appellants' 
undisputed evidence shows that the SBA did not purchase any 
of the loan or receive a transfer of the note executed in favor 
of Capital City. Furthermore, the SBA 
k29 
authorized Capital City in writing the right to enforce the 
: • b 1 i g at io n s < 1 u e from Appellants. T h £ record t h i i s supports 
the district court's ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
; i S T R I C T CoURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUM; MARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CAPITAL CITY BANK 
Under Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civjil Procedure, a, District 
Court may grant a motion for summary judgment :i f the record 
•ihow.s "tl lat there is no geniune issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." JLcL The record before this Cojurt shows that no genuine 
i s i • - • -• r : • L fact exists 11 I a t w c u 1 d p r * > ^  ' i ^  s umm a r y 
judgment. Furthermore, the uncontr0verted facto establish 
that Capital City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
A. Capital City Satisfied Its Burden ol Proof, but 
Appellants Failed to Satisfy! Thfiir Burden 
The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the respective burdens 
of the parties in estab 1 i s 1 111 ig :i ca.s'e f or sun unai: } judgment. 
Appellants seek to have this Court apply federal 
] aw to 1: ot .h substantive and procedural issues. It is well 
settled, however, that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern 
the procedure in civil actions in all Utah courts. Rule 1, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See [also, Erie Railroad Co. 
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) 
Thus, a motion for summary judgment in 
by the procedural requirements of Rule 
Procedure. 
a Utah court is governed 
5 6, Utah R,; . .-.3 of Civil 
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In Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co./ 659 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1983), the Court held that the proponent of a motion 
for summary judgment has the burden of establishing a prima 
facie case for summary judgment. Once the proponent has made 
a
 prima facie case, the opponent of the motion must raise 
material factual disputes in order to avoid the court's 
concluding that there are no disputed factual issues. i^d. at 
1044. See, Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Furthermore, although material factual disputes may be 
raised by affidavit, mere general and conclusory statements 
in an affidavit are insufficient to oppose a motion for summary 
judgment. According to the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he 
allegations of a pleading or factual conclusions of an affidavit 
are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact." Reagon 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 
1984). See also, Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 
2 
1985). Thus, the burden to prove the 
Federal courts interpreting Rule 56(c), Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, have also placed the burden of establishing 
a prima facie case for summary judgment on the movant. See 
e.g. , Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 
26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Once the movant has satisfied its burden, 
the party opposing the motion must provide evidence of a material 
factual dispute. Failure to do so may result in the Court's 
concluding that there are no factual disputes. 
Furthermore/ mere allegations in a pleading or factual 
conclusions in an affidavit are insufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of fact. In Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 746 F.2d 
1407 (10th Cir. 1984), the court stated: 
k29 
existence of a material factual dispute shifts to the party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment after the moving party 
has established its prima facie case. 
On the instant facts, Capital City established a properly 
supported prima facie case for summary judgment, thus satisfying 
its 1 urden. Appellants, however, faliled to i ntroduce any 
evidence that would raise a genuine Issue of material fact. 
The facts as established by Capital C|ity, therefore, must be 
accepted as true. Applying the law tt> the undisputed facts, 
the district court correctly concluded! that Capital City was 
ent:i 11 ed t : summary judgment. 
B. n district Court Correctly Foui id That Tl ier> = Wer E; 
No Disputed Issues of Material Fact 
11 i complaint agai: - ; i;. . *: a 1 City, the P1 ai i itiffs 
(Appellants herein), asked the district court to find that 
Appellants were discharged from any and all liability as 
.-.;j; .i::^ -.* .- ecember 24, 1979 note that was executed 
by Bagel No oh in : ;ivor of Capital Citjk * . Capital 
City, ii i its answer and counterclaim, asiked the court to declare 
It is true that once a properly supported motion 
for summary judgment is made, the opposing party 
may not merely rest on the allegations in the complaint 
and must respond with some factual showing of the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Id ii .1 4J 2 . 
11 
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the validity of the guaranties and to order foreclosure of 
Capital City's interest under the guaranties. R. 32, 5 2. 
Appellants asserted several bases in support of their 
contention that they were discharged from liability under the 
guaranties. Three of those bases are at issue in this appeal. 
One basis for the Appellants' action was that Capital City 
had allegedly breached the guarantee agreement. In particular, 
Appellants contended, inter alia, that Capital Cityfs acts 
constituted an impairment of collateral, which discharged 
Appellants from their obligation under the guarantee agreements. 
R. 7-8. Appellants also argued that they should be discharged 
from liability as guarantors because of Capital City's alleged 
reckless loss of a security interest. R. 8-9. Finally, 
Appellants argued that they should be discharged from liability 
under the guaranties since the obligation underlying the 
guaranties was "substantially modified" by the Loan 
Reconstruction Agreement. R. 9. Appellant's did not submit 
any evidence to support such bare allegations in the pleadings. 
As discussed more fully below, however, Capital City submitted 
evidence showing that the allegations in Appellants1 complaint 
were erroneous. In the face of such evidence, Appellants' 
bare assertions do not raise disputed factual issues. 
On appeal, Appellants contend that, despite Capital City's 
uncontroverted evidence, four factual disputes remain. First, 
Appellants contend that Capital City has received ninety (90%) 
of the loan amount, plus interest from the SBA. Appellants' 
k2 9 
Brief, p. 21 Appellants have provided no evidence to support 
that contention. Respondents have uhequivocally established 
that the SBA has not paid any money to Capital City in connection 
with the note nor has the SBA received a transfer of the note. 
R. 251-252. Appellants, therefore, cannot rest on their bare 
allegatioi is that the SBA paid 90% of th|e loan amount to Capital 
City the face of specific evidence to the contrary. See, 
Reagon, supra. 
Appellants' second contention is that a material factual 
dispute exists concerning whether the guaranties were issued 
t o C a p i t a ] C i t y alone or to Capital City 11 i« I I i i e S B A a s joint 
payees. Appellants' Brief, pp. 25-26. The guaranties are 
par- o: ;- record and speak for themselves _. 36 and 40, 
• * . dispute therefore exi-
Even if such facts were in dispute, however, they are 
not material to the issues before thel Court. The guaranties 
. i . - ,.. . :• * * . .osh under ti le i lote, which 
obligations are due and owing to Capital City. R. 186-188. 
Furthermore, the SBA has authorized Capital City to sue on 
the note I \ 25] -252 s . as established oi i the record, 
the SBA has no cause of action against the Appellants. In 
1 i ght of the undisputed facts, whether the guaranties named 
the SBA becomes irrelevant. The issues set forth above are 
neither disputed nor material and cannot form the basis for 
• :i j s t r i c t c o u i t" s s I i m ixi a r y j i i d g m e n t :i i i f a v o r 
of Capita i d t y * 
1 1 
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Third, Appellants contend that a factual dispute exists 
concerning whether the guarantors made payments to Capital 
City under the guaranties. According to Appellants: 
The district court went on to state that the 
modifications to the underlying indebtedness cannot 
be complained of at this point by the guarantors 
where they have paid under the guaranty since the 
default of the principal debtor Bagel Nosh, and if 
not estopped at this point, have simply given their 
consent to modification. R. 311. There was no factual 
basis for this conclusion in the record before the 
trial court. While counsel for Capital City had 
represented to the court that payments had been made 
by the plaintiffs on the obligation following the 
default and bankruptcy proceeding of Bagel Nosh, 
those were merely representations of counsel 
unsupported by substantive, admissible evidence. 
The court nor the moving party on a motion for summary 
judgment can rely on inadmissible evidence or the 
assertions of counsel in granting a motion for summary 
judgment. 
Appellants1 Brief, p. 28, fn. 14 (citations omitted). That 
argument, however, misrepresents the record on appeal to this 
Court. Appellants thus either intentionally seek to misrepresent 
the facts or have failed to read their own complaint. 
On p. 4, 5 14, of their complaint (R. 5), Appellants state 
as follows: 
14. During the pendancy of Intermountain's bankruptcy 
proceedings, the Plaintiffs, as guarantors, have 
been making payments on the Capital City loan. 
Appellants thus admit in their own pleadings that they made 
payments under the guaranties to Capital City. Capital City 
also has admitted that fact. R. 25, I 14; R. 187, I 15. The 
undisputed facts in the record, therefore, reveal no factual 
k29 
dispute concerning Appellants1 payments to Capital City under 
the guaranties. 
Fourth, Appellants contend that the parties 1 intent to 
revoke the guaranties is a disputed factual issue. Appellants' 
Brief, j: :» 29. That issue, however, is •. - material on the 
instant facts. The intent of parties to a contract becomes 
relevant only if the language of the contract i- "ambiguous 
a n d i 11 i c e r t a i n a n d s u s c e p 11 b 1 e of more t h ^.. .-trucdon." 
17 Am. Jar. 2d, Contracts, §241, p. 626, See also, Utah Valley 
Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1£81 i : L.nnd v. Land, 605 
P.2< I J 248 (Utah 1980). Furthermore, such ambiguities must 
be "patent." See, Greer v. Stanolind (pi 1 & Gas Co., 200 F.2d 
920 (10th Cir. 1952). Court s g e n e 1: a 1 ] y agree t h a t: 
It is fundamental that the principles of construction 
cannot be applied to vary the mealning of that which 
is otherwise clear and unambiguous, and, in this 
respect, it is to be noted that if the language of 
the contract is plain and unambiguous, the intention 
expressed and indicated thereby controls, rather 
than whatever may be claimed to have been the actual 
intention of the parti es. 
1 7 . Am. J u r. 2 d, supra. 
In the instant case, -•-•? express language -^: *.- relevant 
< 1: 5 \ e a ] s 1 1 o • :i :i s p 1 •• .• t D W h e t h e 2: t:.. i n t e n d e d 
the guaranties to be revoked. The Loan R e s t r J C T J I ~ Agreement 
expressly states that "•*-./ item in the Loan Agreement dated 
Decein.be 1: 2 1, ] 9 / 9 , tha• s not specif ica] 1 y modif i ed by this 
Loan Restructure Agreement remains in full force," R, 44, 
11
 N o t h :i 1 1 g :i 1 1 R e s 1: r 1 1 c t u r e A g r e e m e n 1: e x p r e s s J y 
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modifies the guaranties. In fact, the Loan Restructure Agreement 
specifically refers to the personal guaranties that were executed 
in connection with the original note. R. 44, 5 15. The personal 
guaranties thus remain in full force. in the face of the express 
language of the Loan Restructure Agreement, the parties' intent 
is not a relevant issue. 
Furthermore, even if Appellants1 third and fourth 
contentions of factual disputes were correct, those facts are 
relevant only to establishing that the guaranties are not 
enforceable. Appellants, however, have admitted, in pleadings 
filed in connection with the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy proceeding, 
their continuing personal liability under the guaranties. 
R. 283. Such admissions thus belie the existence of a material 
factual dispute on that issue that could preclude summary 
judgment. 
Appellants submitted no evidence in response to Capital 
Cityfs properly supported factual assertions nor did they object: 
to any evidence submitted by Capital City in support of its 
motion for summary judgment. Rather, the Appellants rested 
on the bare allegations of their pleadings. Appellants thus 
failed to show the existence of any genuine issues of material 
fact. The district court was, therefore, correct in concluding 
that "the allegations of 'material issues of fact remaining1 
by the Plaintiffs are without merit." R. 311. 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW 
TO THE I INDISPUTED FACTS 
The properly supported and uncontiroverted facts establish 
that Capital City is entitled to summairy judgment as a matter 
of law. As the district court found, and as the note provides, 
ti le substantive law to be applied is federal law. R. 105-106; 
R. 310. Under federal law, all substantive issues before this 
Court were appropriately resolved by the district court in 
f a v o r o£ Capital City. Furthermore, according to the district 
court, even if Utah law were applied, Capital City would prevail 
as a matter of law. R. 308-313. 
/\. Appe : : ; Contentions that '..he D. strict Court Erred 
A; .i Matter of Law aro Merttless 
Appel] ants argue that the district court's deci si on should 
be overturned on the basis of three erroneous legal conclusions. 
First, Appellants assert that the trial] court erred in holding 
th.if I'jf.n.il "' i l y , ,i', IJ. I let or the nojte and guaranties, could 
enforce the obligations thereunder. Appellants' Brief, p. 25. 
That argument impl ies that the district court relied on 
-.: - a s 11: I =:!: I i o ] d e r o f | t h e . a i i :I :j u a i: a i 11 ies 
as the solo oos; ; • r holding that Capital City could enforce 
those documents. Appellants' argument thus seriously 
misconstrues the district court's memoraAdum decision. According 
to the Court: 
Fo r t he purposes of Rule 52(a) of the U t a h Ru Ies 
of Civil Procedure, the Court has granted Capital's 
k29 
motion on all the bases alleged by Capital in its 
moving papers and supporting documents, with the 
exception of the claims of laches, which the Court 
determines would require a further hearing, and are 
not ripe for summary judgment 
R. 312 (emphasis added). Contrary to Appellants' argument, 
the district court thus rested its conclusions on all bases 
that were alleged by Capital City. 
Capital City alleged two other bases for its contention 
that Capital City could enforce the note and guaranties in 
addition to its argument that it had such rights as the holder 
of those documents. Capital City argued that it could enforce 
the note and guaranties because Appellants had admitted their 
liability under the guaranties in the pleadings that were filed 
in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy proceedings. Based on that 
admission, Capital City contended that Appellants were estopped 
from arguing that they were not liable on the guaranties. 
R. 243; R. 283. Capital City also argued that it could enforce 
the note and guaranties since Appellants had waived any defense 
that they were not liable by paying under the guaranties. R. 5; 
R. 93-94. Thus, the court's holding that Capital City could 
enforce the guaranties was based on Capital City's allegations 
of estoppel and waiver as well as Capital Cityfs status as 
holder of the documents. 
Appellants, however, do not assert that the court's reliance 
on estoppel and waiver were erroneous. They ask this court 
to overturn, the district court's decision due to an alleged 
error on only one of three bases relied on by the district 
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court Appellants assertion that the district court erred in 
concluding that Capital City could enforce the note and 
guaranties : ;, therefore, frivolous and Without foundation. 
Even if the district court had concluded that the SBA 
was not indispensable solely because Caplital City was the holder 
of ' ' ^' ' instruments, that conclusion would have 
been erroneous. As Appellants concede, the law is clear that 
the holder of negotiable instruments flay sue to enforce such 
instruments. Appellants' Brief, p. 25|. See also, Utah Code 
Ann^ §§70A-3-301 and 70A-3-603 (1980). 
Appellants1 reliance on an exception in Arizona law to 
the general rule is misplaced und^r t|he facts of this case. 
Appellants rely on Vance v. Vance, 601| .2d 605 (Ariz. 1979) 
to sI ippi :):i I 1: h e i r • :oi Itent i o i t 1 Ii 11 : • • i< * c ): t w < : jc >i i l t : payees on 
a negotiable instrument cannot enforcd the instrument alone. 
In Vance, the joint payees were a huiband and wife involved 
i
 L i | p . ' p . ' M f i i.-.pi 11.. 1 II 'winq i divorce. • I'l le wi fe sought 
to enforce a negotiable instrument payable to both her and 
her ex-husband W.T.CU*- : ? consent. Since the ex-husband was 
e. ,;vyie< it "il! • J| :] : - v _ . . _ _i. _•.. . -- w a s l u m e d as < i necessary 
part y and the -•'.--
 :- : Pl0t dismiss the case. M • a t 607-
Even in Vance the Arizona Supreme Court did not hold that the 
1 iusband wa s an indispensable party wi thout whom the case could 
not proceed. 
The f( ;2^cl- -.— . - • 
The Vance JL-U: :. addressed the enforceability of negotiable 
1 9 
k29 
instruments. Under applicable federal law, however, the form 
148 guaranties executed by the Appellants are not instruments. 
In United States v. Meadors, 753 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1985), 
the Court stated that "a [SBA Form 148] guaranty is not a 
negotiable instrument if it contains a conditional promise 
to pay . . .." _Id.. at 599. Appellants seek to distinguish 
Meadors on the basis that the present guaranties are 
unconditional. That distinction becomes meritless, however, 
upon an examination of the facts. 
The SBA Form 148 guaranties signed by Appellants were 
unconditional and absolute once the obligation became due and 
was not paid by the Debtor. The Appellants had no obligation 
to Capital City, however, until Bagel Nosh defaulted on the 
underlying obligation. The guaranties specifically provide: 
In case the Debtor shall fail to pay all or any part 
of the liabilities when due, whether by acceleration 
or otherwise, according to the terms of said note, 
the undersigned, immediately upon the written demand 
of Lender, will pay to Lender the amount due and 
unpaid by the Debtor as aforesaid, in like manner 
as if such amount constituted the direct and primary 
obligation of the undersigned. 
R. 36 and 40. As set forth in Meadors, such a "condition" 
thus precludes the guaranties from being classified as 
instruments. 
The uncontroverted facts in the instant case further 
establish that, unlike the facts in Vance, the SBA is not a 
joint payee on the note. The SBA is merely a participant who 
has not purchased any of the loan from Capital City and who 
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has not received a transfer or a$signment of the note. 
R. 251-252. The SBA thus has no caus£ of action against the 
Appellants. Furthermore, the SBA has expressly given Capital 
City written authorization to enforce the instruments. 
R. 251-252. The joint payee exception §n negotiable instruments 
argued by Appellants does not apply td the instant facts, and 
Capital City, as holder of the note ancl guaranties, may enforce 
the obligations thereunder. Any alleged error of law on the 
grounds set forth by the Appellants is tf:hus meritless and cannot 
form the basis for overturning summarjy judgment in favor of 
Capital City. 
Second, Appellants argue that th£ trial court committed 
reversible errors of law in concluding that Appellants1 claims 
of impairment of collateral, reckless loss of security interest, 
and modification were invalid, since it based that decision 
on the express waiver of rights in tihe guarantee agreement. 
Appellants1 Brief, p. 28. Appellants1 argument, however, 
misconstrues the district court's memorandum decision. 
In its decision, the district cou^ rt expressly found that, 
even disregarding the waiver in the guaranties, the 
uncontroverted facts could not form tl^ e basis for a cause of 
action against Capital City. Concerning the Appellants1 claim 
of impairment of collateral, the court stated, "even if Utah 
law was applicable, no breach can be sho^n." R. 310. Therefore, 
the district court found that Plaintiffs had failed to state 
a cause of action irrespective of the waiver in the guaranties. 
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Concerning the Appellants1 claim of reckless loss of a 
security interest, the undisputed evidence submitted by Capital 
City established the continuing validity of Capital City's 
security interest. According to the court, "As the record 
is clear that Capital has in fact protected its security 
interests, even if Utah law were applicable, Capital has 
complied." R. 311. Thus, although the district court found 
that the waivers in the guaranties were enforceable, the court 
also expressly held that there were no facts in the record 
to support Appellants1 allegations of impairment of collateral 
or reckless loss of a security interest under either federal 
or Utah law. 
The district court also found that the modifications in 
the Loan Restructure Agreement did not excuse the Appellants 
from liability under the guaranties. R. 311. Although the 
Appellants had expressly consented to modification of the note 
in the guaranties, Appellants1 consent in the guaranties was 
not the only basis for the court's conclusion. The court stated: 
Certainly, the modifications which are in actuality 
more favorable to the Plaintiffs/guarantors cannot 
be complained of at this point by the guarantors 
where they have paid under the guarantee since the 
default of the principal debtor, Bagel Nosh, and 
if not estopped at this point, have impliedly given 
their consent to the modification. Accordingly, 
the Plaintiffs/guarantors have waived the defense 
regarding modification and if they have not so waived 
that defense through the guaranties, they are estopped 
and have otherwise consented to the modification. 
R. 11. Thus, the express language of the Memorandum Decision 
evidences the Courtfs consideration of facts and applicable 
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law outside the waivers in the guaranties, making Appellants' 
contention meritless. 
Furthermore, that factual argument is irrelevant. The 
record shows that the guarantors have admitted their continuing 
obligations under the guaranties in the legal pleadings filed 
by Appellants in connection with the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy 
proceedings. R. 283. The record also shows that Appellants 
have waived any defense of non-liabilit^ under the guaranties 
by making payments thereunder. R. 24^ <J[ 14; R. 187, 5 15. 
Unsupported factual assertions that tljie guaranties are not 
enforceable due to modifications in th^ underlying agreement, 
therefore, carry no evidentiary value in the face of Appellants' 
admissions. 
Even if the district court had rfolied on the guaranty 
agreements as the only bases for its decision, however, the 
decision would . have been correct as a Jnatter of law. As set 
forth above, the unconditional personal guaranties executed 
by each Appellant are valid and thus preclude the assertion 
of any of the defenses claimed by Appellants. The district 
court's decision is supported by the f^cts in the record and 
is a correct application of the law. ^s such, it may not be 
upset on appeal. 
Third, Appellants argue that the district court erred 
in failing to consider whether the parties intended to revoke 
the guaranties when the Loan Restructure Agreement was executed. 
Appellants1 Brief, pp. 32-33. As discussed in Point B above, 
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the parties' intent is irrelevant on the instant facts. The 
court's failure to consider an irrelevant argument cannot be 
an error of law. Furthermore, Appellants did not submit any 
evidence concerning intent to revoke the guaranties. Appellants 
merely rested on the bare allegations in their pleadings. 
Capital City, however, submitted evidence in opposition to 
Appellants1 assertions. The facts as set forth by Capital 
City may, therefore, be considered undisputed. In light of 
the record, the district court did not err as a matter of law 
in failing to consider an issue that was not even raised as 
a factual dispute. 
Each of the alleged errors of law asserted by Plaintiffs 
is based on a misrepresentation and reconstruction of the 
district court's memorandum decision. Furthermore, the 
applicable law does not support Appellants' arguments. Finally, 
such alleged errors of law are irrelevant to the issues before 
this Court. The frivolous and unfounded allegations should 
thus be disregarded and should not form the basis for overturning 
the trial court's decision. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE SBA WAS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY 
Appellants filed a complaint against Capital City asking 
the trial court to declare that "the Guaranty Agreements entered 
into by each of the individual Plaintiffs guarantying the 
obligations of Intermountain to the Defendant on or about 
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December 24, 1979, to be void and of no effect and discharging 
the Plaintiffs from any obligation thereunder." R. 10, 5 1. 
The SBA was not named as a party defendant in the action, despite 
Appellants1 demand that Appellants be discharged from all 
obligations under the guaranties. R. 2 — 13- -
Capital City counterclaimed, asking the court to hold 
that the guaranties are valid obligations of the Appellants. 
R. 32, H 2. Both Appellants and Capit41 City thus asked the 
court to determine the validity of the guaranties and the 
Appellants' liability thereunder. Despite the complete identity 
of the issues involved in the complaint and counterclaim, 
Appellants did not seek to amend the complaint in order to 
add the SBA as a party to the action. Obviously, Appellants 
did not consider the SBA to be necessary or indispensable to 
a determination of liability under the guaranties. Appellants 
contended, however, in their memorandum opposing Capital City's 
motion for summary judgment, that the $BA is an indispensible 
party to Capital City's counterclaim and asked the court to 
dismiss the counterclaim if the SBA could not be joined. 
R. 218-221. Appellants contention that tfne SBA is indispensable 
to the counterclaim thus contradicts Appellants' own actions. 
In ruling on whether the SBA was an indispensible party 
to the counterclaim, the trial court stated that "the defense 
is without merit." R. 312. The court also noted that "the 
SBA is not under the present interpretation of the Rules of 
Procedure an indispensable party to this action." R. 312. 
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The district court's decision that joinder of the SBA is not 
essential may not be disturbed on appeal unless the district 
court abused its discretion in reaching that decision. 
Bonnevillle Tower v. Thompson Michie Assoc,, 728 P.2d 1017, 
1020 (Utah 1986). See also, R.J. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor 
Corp., 555 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1977); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnel 
Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Appellants have not demonstrated that the district court 
abused its discretion in concluding that the SBA was not an 
indispensable party to the case. In support of their appeal 
from the district court's ruling on that issue, Appellants 
argue that the trial court did not "comply with the procedural 
requirements of Rule 19 and applicable federal case law." 
Appellants* Brief, p. 12. That argument, however, ignores 
the policies underlying Rule 19. Furthermore, the federal 
case law cited by Appellants in support of their position is 
not applicable to this action in the Utah courts. Finally, 
even if federal law applied, it does not support Appellants1 
position. 
As discussed in Point II above, the procedural aspects 
of this case are governed by Utah procedural rules. Rule 19, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that before dismissing 
a case for nonjoinder of a party, a court must determine if 
the party is "necessary," to the litigation for several reasons 
set forth in the rule. If a court finds that the party is 
"necessary" it may not dismiss the action unless the court 
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determines that it cannot shape relief <$r lessen the prejudice 
in some fashion to avoid the harm that could result from 
proceeding without the "necessary" painty. Rule 19(b) thus 
requires courts to refrain from dismissing a case for nonjoinder 
of a party if any prejudice that could be caused as a result 
of the nonjoinder can be mitigated through less drastic action. 
See, Provident Trademens Bank and Tru$t Co., 390 U.S. 102, 
19 L.Ed.2d 936, 88 S.Ct. 733 (1968) (cited approvingly by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Toledjp, 699 P. 2d 711 (Utah 
1985) and in Sanpete County, etc., v. jPrice River, etc., 652 
P.2d 1302 (Utah 1982) for its interpretation of Rule 19, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which is "substantially identical" 
to Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah Court Rules 
Ann. Rule 19, Compiler's notes (1987)). 
All of the federal cases cited by Appellants reflect the 
policy underlying Rule 19, Federal Rul^s of Civil Procedure, 
that a court must determine if it can 
dismissal if a necessary party cannot be 
the trial court had dismissed the action upon a determination 
that a necessary party could not be 
courts in each instance reversed and 
determination of whether less drastic action would be 
appropriate. See, Provident Trademens 
390 U.S. 102, 19 L.Ed.2d 936, 88 S.Ct 
"To say that a court 'must' dismiss 
indispensable party and that it 'cannot proceed' without him 
puts the matter in the wrong way around: a court does not know 
whether a particular person is 'indispensable' until it has 
examined the situtation to determine whether it can proceed 
without him." IcL at 19, L.Ed.2d 950 Manygoats v. Kleppe, 
558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977) (remandir 
whether prejudice was actual and thus 
Wright v. First National Bank of Altus, Oklahoma, 483 F.2d 
73 (10th Cir. 1973) (remanding to thetrial court for reasons 
fashion relief without 
joined. in each case, 
joined. The appellate 
remanded the case for 
Bank and Trust Co., 
733 (1968) (stating, 
in the absence of an 
ng for a determination 
requiring dismissal); 
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In the instant case, however, the district court concluded 
that the SBA was not indispensable and did not dismiss the 
action. R. 312. Under Rule 19, the court need not engage 
in the same analysis that would be required if the court had 
dismissed the action for lack of an indispensable party. The 
court's failure to discuss the factors set forth in Rule 19(b) 
thus does not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Furthermore, Appellants' argument ignores the purpose 
of Rule 19. According, to the Utah Supreme Court: 
The purpose of Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which requires the joinder of indispensable 
parties as a condition to suit, is to guard against 
the entry of judgments which might prejudice the 
rights of such parties in their absence. 
Sanpete County, supra, at 1306. From th- facts in the record, 
it is evident that no harm to either the present parties or 
the SBA could result from the trial court's ruling. Although 
Appellants assert that they have an "overpowering substantive 
interest . . . to not be subjected to additional, duplicative 
liability by the piecemeal adjudication of the specific guaranty 
agreementsf" Appellants' Brief, p. 13, Appellants do not 
demonstrate how a failure to join the SBA could impair that 
interest. 
why the trial court cannot proceed in the absence of a necessary 
party). Thus, even under Rule 19, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which Appellants seek to have this Court apply, 
a court must justify its decision to dismiss a case for 
nonjoinder of a necessary party under the analysis set forth 
in subsection (b) of the rule. 
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Conversely, the uncontroverted facts in the record establish 
that no interest of the Appellants could be compromised by 
a failure to join the SBA as a party to this action. Bagel 
Nosh executed a note in favor of Capitalj City in the principal 
sum of $300,000.00 on or about Decembexf 24, 1979, R. 3, fl 5; 
R. 28, ?[2, and the Appellants executed absolute, unconditional 
guaranties of that note in favor of Capital City Bank on the 
same date. R. 4, J 7; R. 28, f A. The loan to Bagel Nosh 
was fully funded by Capital City, R. 18| 7; R. 251-252, and the 
SBA has not purchased any portion of the debt nor have the 
Note or guaranties been transferred to the SBA. R. 251-252. 
Therefore, since the SBA has not purchased any of the loan 
or received an assignment or transfer f the note, the SBA 
4 
has no present right to proceed against Appellants. 
Appellants argue that Rule 19 should be applied to avoid 
possible harm, not only certain harm. 
the SBA has no possible cause of acti 
As set forth above, 
on against Appellants. 
That argument is thus inapplicable on the instant facts. 
However, even if the SBA possibly could pring an action against 
Appellants, Rule 19 does not require jcjinder of the SBA. In 
Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F.2d 1102 (4th 
Cir. 1980) , a contractor sued a supplier of air traffic control 
towers for defective units that were supplied to the contractor 
and thereafter put into a Navy insta 
Navy insisted that it looked to the contractor for correction 
of the problem, the supplier contended 
indispensible party and must be joined 
potential of multiple liability. Upho 
the Fourth Circuit stated: 
ilation. Although the 
that the Navy was an 
in order to avoid the 
ding the trial court, 
[The supplier] contends that it njay be subject to 
a substantial risk of incurring multiple obligations 
because the Navy is not a party to the action. The 
trial court justifiably found, hcbwever, that [the 
supplier] could only theorize the! possibility that 
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Furthermore, the SBA has authorized Capital City in writing 
to sue on the note and guaranties. R. 251-252. Thus, even 
if the SBA were to purchase part of the note under the 
participation agreement with Capital City, they would only 
have a cause of action against Capital City. The uncontroverted 
facts in the record establish that Appellants are not and cannot 
be harmed by a failure to join the SBA. Any duplicative 
liability of Appellants is thus precluded. The district court 
thus did not err in concluding that the SBA was not an 
indispensable party. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not err in gr ating summary judgment 
in favor of Capital City. Capital Ciry, on the undisputed 
facts before the court, satisfied its burden of establishing 
that Capital City is entitled to summary judgment in its favor 
as a matter of law. Although Appellants assert that genuine 
issues of material fact should have precluded summary judgment, 
Appellants failed to introduce any evidence whatsoever to raise 
the Navy would institute suit against it. Nothing 
before the court suggested a substantial likelihood 
of such a suit . . . we find no abuse of discretion 
under the circumstances. 
Id. at 1108. Similarly, in the instant case there is nothing 
to suggest that the SBA would institute suit against the 
Appellants. In fact, the uncontroverted facts in evidence 
establish that the SBA has given Capital City authorization 
to sue on the note and guaranties. Thus, as in Coastal, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
the SBA is not an indispensable party. 
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any disputed issues. 
The district court did not err in concluding that the 
undisputed facts entitled Capital City to summary judgment 
as a matter of law. The undisputed fapts in the record show 
that Appellants admitted their liability under the guaranties 
in pleadings filed by Appellants in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy 
proceedings. Appellants also waived ^ny claims that their 
personal guaranties had been revoked or were otherwise 
unenforceable by their payments to Capital City under the 
guaranties. Furthermore, Appellants failed to establish that 
intent to modify the guaranties is even relevant, since the 
voan restructure agreement is clear oifi its face as to the 
continuing validity of the guaranties. 
Even if the guaranties were not enforceable, however, 
Appellants would not be able to recover. Appellants did not 
produce any evidence showing how Capital City allegedly impaired 
collateral or recklessly lost its security interest in the 
collateral or that Capital City had a legal duty to refrain 
from doing so. 
Finally, Appellants failed to produce any evidence that 
the SBA is an indispensable party. Th^ undisputed facts show 
that the SBA did not purchase any of the loan to Appellants 
or receive a transfer or assignment of the note that was executed 
in favor of Capital City. Thus, the SBi^  does not have a cause 
of action against Appellants. Even if the SBA did have any 
right to proceed against Appellants, however, the SBA authorized 
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Capital City in writing to enforce any obligations due from 
Appellants. The SBA is not, therefore, necessary or 
indispensable to this case. 
The record before this Court evidences no genuine issue 
of material fact that would preclude summary judgment in favor 
of Capital City as a matter of law. Based on an examination 
of the record and an analysis of the applicable law, each and 
every claim by Appellants is meritless. Furthermore, the 
district court was correct in ruling in favor of Capital City 
on its counterclaim. From the facts in the record and as a 
matter of law, the district court correctly granted Capital 
City's motion for summary judgment. 
Wherefore, Respondent respectfully requests this Court 
to affirm the district court's decision and the partial final 
judgment in their entirety and award to Capital City costs 
and attorneys1 fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA J 
SEFTEL, and MICHAEL LANDES ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, ] 
a Utah Corporation 
Defendant• ] 
1 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel and Michael 
Landes, by and through their attorneys Daniel W. Jackson and 
Jeffrey W. Wilkinson, complain and allege against the Defendant 
as follows: 
JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiffs Sidney Seftel arid Theresa Seftel are 
residents of the State of Utah, resi4ing at 8501 Kings Hill 
Drive, Salt Lake City, UT 84121. 
2. Plaintiff Michael Landes is a resident of the State 
of New York with offices located at the Almi Building, 158 5 
Broadway, New York, NY 1003 6. 
3. Defendant Capital City Bank is a Utah corporation 
with principal offices located at 2200 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84115 
4. The Plaintiffs' claim against the Defendant arises 
from a business transaction between the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendant within the State of Utah. Therefore, jurisdiction and 
venue are proper in this court. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. On or about December 24, 1979, Defendant Capital 
City Bank loaned $300,000.00 to Bagel Nosh Intermountain Ltd., a 
New York corporation ("Intermountain"). The interest on the 
loan was at a variable rate. (Copies of the Note and the 
Authorization and Loan Agreement are attached as Exhibit "A,f.) 
6* The purpose of the loan was to finance the 
construction and operation of a Bagel Nosh restaurant in Park 
City, Utah. All of Intermountain^ property at this location 
was pledged as security for the loan. Defendant filed a 
financing statement covering all equipment, smallwares and 
2 
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fixtures located at the Park City restaurant, pursuant to the 
loan documents, 
7. On or about December 24, 1979, the Plaintiffs 
executed Guaranty Agreements in connection with this loan. 
(Copies of those agreements are attached a$ Exhibit B.) 
8. On or about October 31, 19^0, Intermountain1s Park 
City restaurant was closed. The Park City equipment, machinery, 
furniture and supplies were moved to Intermountain1s restaurant 
located at Crossroads Mall in Salt^  Lake City, Utah. 
Intermountain subleased the restaurant space at Crossroads from 
Powder Hound Holding Corporation, a Utah corporation. 
9. The Plaintiffs are informed an£ believe and on the 
basis of that information and belief alplege that the Defendant 
had actual, constructive and inquiry notice of the close of the 
Park City location and of the transfer of the secured property 
to the Crossroads location. 
10. Despite such notice, the Defehdant failed to amend 
its financing statement to reflect that It had any claim to the 
property located at the Crossroads Mall restaurant. 
AAAB/cc 
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11. On November 29, 1984, Intermountain filed a 
voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. 
12. Defendant has had actual, constructive and inquiry 
notice pertaining to all matters relating to Intermountain's 
bankruptcy. 
13. Despite such notice, the Defendant failed to take 
any steps in Bankruptcy Court to secure its right in the secured 
property above that of other creditors in Intermountain1s 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
14. During the pendancy of Intermountain1s bankruptcy 
proceedings, the Plaintiffs, as guarantors, have been making 
payments on the Capital City loan. 
15. On or about February 5, 1986, a default judgment 
was entered against Power Hound Holding Corporation, dba Bagel 
Nosh in favor of Crossroads Plaza Associates for past due rent. 
16. On said date, a Writ of Execution and Restitution 
was issued against all of the property located at the Crossroads 
Mall restaurant. 
AAAB/cc 
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17. On or about February 7, ]J984, the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County took possession of said properlty. 
18. The Plaintiffs are informed land believe and on the 
basis of said information and belief al|lege that a loan officer 
at Capital City, on or about February lk, 1985, unequivocally 
represented to an agent of Crossroads Pllaza Associates that the 
Defendant did not have any interest in Intermountain's property 
at the Crossroads Mall restaurant. 
19. The loan officer's denial (sf any security interest 
in the Intermountain property located ajt the Crossroads Mall 
restaurant constitutes a waiver of th£ Defendant's security 
interest in the collateral. 
20. Subsequent to said r^presenration by the 
Defendant's agent, the Intermountain property was sold at a 
sheriff's sale on or about February 21, 19^6, in execution of a 
landlords' lien alleged to be helcfl. by Crossroads Plaza 
Associates. 
21. All proceeds from the sa^e went to Crossroads 
Plaza Associates in payment of past due rer^ t. 
5 
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22. Pursuant to Section 70A-1-203 of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code, Capital City Bank, as creditor, has a duty to 
act in good faith in connection with the performance and 
enforcement of the loan contract. 
23. Therefore, Defendant had a duty to protect its 
security interest in the Intermountain property located at the 
Crossroads Mall restaurant. 
24. The Defendant breached this duty by the following 
acts and omissions: 
a. The Defendant failed to properly perfect and 
maintain a perfected interest in the collateral pledged 
by Intermountain. 
b. The Defendant failed to properly amend its 
financing statement to give proper notice to subsequent 
purchasers of its security interest in Intermountain*s 
property located at the Crossroads Mall restaurant. 
c. The Defendant failed to take any actions in the 
Bankruptcy Court to secure its rights to the collateral 
above other creditors in Intermountain1s bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
AAAB/cc 
6 
d. The Defendant abandoned and waived its interest in 
the collateral by its representations to the agent for 
Crossroads Plaza Associates that i[t had no interest in 
the Crossroads property. 
25. But for the Defendant's wijllful and reckless acts 
and willful and reckless failure to act, the collateral would 
not have been lost, 
26. Said collateral was sufficient to pay the amount 
outstanding on the loan. 
27. The Defendant's loss of [its right to recover 
against the collateral has damaged the Plaintiffs by impairing 
their right to subsequently recover tjieir losses from the 
collateral. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
28. Plaintiffs hereby reallege the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 as if fully set forth 
herein. 
AAAB/cc 
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29. Said acts and omissions of the Defendant 
constitute a breach of the Guaranty Agreements and by their 
terms discharge the Plaintiffs1 obligations as guarantors. 
30. The transaction between Intermountain, Plaintiffs 
and the Defendant is governed by Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
Sections 70-3-101 et. seq. 
31. The Defendant's acts constitute an unjustifiable 
impairment of the collateral which discharges the Plaintiffs1 
obligation pursuant to Section 70A-3-606(l)(b) of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
RECKLESS LOSS OF SECURITY INTEREST 
32. Plaintiffs hereby reallege the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 31 as if fully set forth 
herein. 
33. Defendant acted willfully or recklessly in its 
acts and omissions detailed above and breached its duty to the 
Plaintiffs an guarantors, to perfect and maintain its interest 
in the collateral. 
AAAB/cc 
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34. The willful and reckless afcts and omissions of the 
Defendant resulted in a total impairment pf the collateral and 
precludes any recovery from the collateral by Plaintiffs 
pursuant to their rights of subrogation. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
CHANGE OF PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION 
35. The Plaintiffs reallege the allegations contained 
in paragraphs 1 through 3 4 as if fully set forth herein. 
36. The Plaintiffs are informe4 and believe and on the 
basis of said information and belief allege that on March 30, 
1983, the Defendant and Intermountain entered into a Loan 
Restructure Agreement which substantially modified the December 
24, 1979 loan agreement. 
37. Because said agreement substantially modified the 
original loan agreement for which the Plain|tiffs were guarantors 
and the Plaintiffs did not assent to tfae modifications, their 
obligations as guarantors are discharged. 
WHEREFORE, The Plaintiffs pray for| the following relief 
pursuant to the allegations contained i^i the First, Second and 
AAAB/cc 
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Third Causes of Action, and demand judgment against the 
Defendant as follows: 
1. For an order of the court declaring the Guaranty 
Agreements entered into by each of the individual Plaintiffs 
guaranteeing the obligations of Intermountain to the Defendant 
on or about December 24, 1979, to be void and of no effect and 
discharging the Plaintiffs from any obligation thereunder; 
2. For the costs incurred in bringing this action, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the court 
deems appropriate. 
Dated this //J^j day of March, 1986, 
JACKSON & W 
Plaintiffsf addresses: 
Sidney & Theresa Seftel 
8501 Kings Hill Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Michael Landes 
Almi Building 
1585 Broadwaiy 
New York, NY 10036 
SON 
CKSON 
/.'WILKINSON 
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Herschel J. Saperstein (2861) 
Karen C. Jensen(1680) 
Steven T. Waterman (4164) 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant, Capital City Bank 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAK|E COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, ) 
and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah ; 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and 
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Civil No. C86-1810 
(Judge Hanson) 
CAPITAL CITY BANK'S MEMORANDUM 
) OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
) MOfTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
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Capital City Bank (hereinafter "Capital City") by and through its counsel. 
Watkiss & Campbell, files this memorandum of points and authorities in support f 
its Motion for Summary Judgment in accordance with Rule 2, Supplementary; R .:• 
of Practice - Third Judicial District, and this Court's Ex Parte Order granting - •.• 
to file a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in excess of five (5) pages in k>r_--
Plaintiffs, Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel (hereinafter "Seftel"), and Michael I. ^  • 
(hereinafter "Landes"), may be referred to herein collectively as "Guarantors." 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On or about December 24, 1979, Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd.. i 
New York corporation (hereinafter "Bagel Nosh"), executed a Note (hereinafter "Nof.e > 
in favor of Capital City in the principal sum of $300,000.00, which note was executes 
by Sidney Seftel as Vice-President of Bagel Nosh, opy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by this refe nee. [Plaintiffs1 Complaint f! 5. 
admitted by Capital City; Capital City's Counterclaim If 2, admitted by Plaintiffs] 
2. As explicitly stated, the Note was executed by Bagel Nosh to secure 
a loan in which the Small Business Administration (hereinafter "SBA"), an agency 
of the United States, is participating. [See Note (last paragraph), Exhibit 1] 
3. The Note provides that federal law governs its enforcement. [See Note 
(last paragraph) Exhibit 1; See also 13 C.F.R. §101.1(d)] 
4. Seftel and Landes, Plaintiffs, are the officers and directors of Bagel 
Nosh, according to the certified statement of the State of Utah - Department of 
Business Regulation which includes documents signed by Landes and Sidney Seftel 
as officers of Bagel Nosh, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 ana 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
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5. Sidney Seftel and Landes resigned as officers and directors of Bagel 
Nosh although each owns fifty percent (50%) of the stock of Bagel Nosh according 
to the sworn statement of the authorized officer of Bagel Nosh filed in the Bagel 
Nosh bankruptcy proceeding, a certified copy ot\ which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
3 and incorporated herein by this reference. 
6. On even date with the Note, Seftel executed an absolute, unconditional, 
personal guaranty (SBA Form 148) (hereinafter "Seftel Guaranty") of the Note ;n 
favor of Capital City, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 4 and incorporated 
herein by this reference. [Plaintiffs' Complaint 1(7, admitted by Capital City; Capital 
City Counterclaim 1(4, admitted by Seftel]. 
7. Of even date with the Seftel Guaranty, Seftel executed a Trust Deed 
(hereinafter ffSeftel Trust Deed") in favor of Capital City as collateral security for 
the Seftel Guaranty, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 5 and incorporated 
herein by this reference. [Capital City's Answer and Counterclaim 115, admitted 
by Seftel] 
8. On even date with the Note, Lande$ executed an absolute, unconditional. 
personal guaranty (SBA Form 148) (hereinafter "Landes Guaranty") of the Note m 
favor of Capital City, a copy of which is attachedl hereto as Exhibit 6 and incorporated 
herein by this reference. [Plaintiffs' Complaint 1(7, admitted by Capital City; Capital 
City's Answer and Counterclaim 11 7, admitted by Llandes] 
9. On even date with the Landes Guaranty, Landes executed a Trust Deed 
(hereinafter "Landes Trust Deed") in favor of Capital City as collateral security for 
the Landes Guaranty, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 7 and incorporated 
herein by this reference, [Capital City's Answer and Counterclaim 1f8, admitted 
by Landes] 
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10. The Seftel Guaranty and Landes Guaranty, previously incorporated 
as Exhibits 4 and 6, (which are identical SBA Form 148 absolute, unconditional, personal 
guaranties) explicitly state: 
[T]o Lender . . . the due and punctual payment when due, whether by 
acceleration or otherwise . . . of the principal of and interest on and 
all sums payable . . . with respect to the note of the Debtor . . .. 
* * * * * 
[G]rants to Lender full power, in its uncontrolled discretion and without 
notice . . . to deal in any manner with the liabilities and the collateral, 
including . . . [power]: 
(a) To modify or otherwise change any terms of all or any part 
of the liabilities or the rate of interest thereon . . . to grant 
any extension or renewal thereof . . . and to effect any release, 
compromise, or settlement with respect thereto: 
* * * * * 
(d) To consent to the substitution, exchange, or release of all or 
any part of the collateral. . .. 
* * * * * 
The obligations of the [Plaintiffs] hereunder shall not be released, 
discharged, or in any way affected, nor shall the [Plaintiffs] have any 
rights or recourse against Lender, by reason of any action Lender may 
take or omit to take under the foregoing powers, (emphasis added). 
11. On or about March 30, 1983, Bagel Nosh, Capital City, and the SBA 
entered into a Loan Restructure Agreement modifying the terms of the Note, a copy 
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 8 and incorporated herein by this reference. 
[Plaintiffs' Complaint 11 36, admitted in part by Capital City] 
12. The Loan Restructure Agreement was signed by Sidney Seftel and 
provided for: (a) curing the existing default in payments on the Note; (b) payment 
of a minimal amount on the principal indebtedness; (c) Bagel Nosh to submit monthly 
financiail statements; (d) personal financial statements of Sidney Seftel and Landes 
to be submitted; (e) a reduction in monthly payments from $5,557.50 per month to 
n6 
$4,000.00 per month; and (f) a reduction in thq interest rate charged by one-half of 
one percent. 
13. Bagel Nosh filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code on November 29, 1984. [Plaintiffs' Complain|t 1111, admitted by Capital City] 
14. As alleged by Plaintiffs, during the pendency of the Bagel No>h 
bankruptcy proceeding, Plaintiffs, as Guarantors^ have been making monthly payment > 
in the reduced amount on the Note in favor of Capital City in accordance with the 
provisions of the Loan Restructure Agreement. [Plaintiffs' Complaint 1(14, admitted 
by Capital City] 
15. Seftel and Landes, Plaintiffs, ar0 also the officers and directors of 
Powder Hound Holding Corporation, a Utah corporation (TTPowder Hound"), according 
to the certified copies of the Articles of Incorporation and annual reports filed Aith 
the State of Utah - Department of Business Regulations which include the signature 
of Theresa Seftel, copies of which are attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
this reference. 
16. A judgment by default for failure to answer the complaint was entered 
against Powder Hound and in favor of Crossroads Plaza Associates on February 5. 
1985, in Case No. C85-256 of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
and recorded in Docket 195 at page 2223, a certified copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 10 and incorporated herein by this refenence. 
17. Seftel and Landes are co-defendants with Powder Hound in the action 
referenced in paragraph 16 above and filed answers of their own in that proceeding 
but not on behalf of Powder Hound as evidenced by the certified copies of those 
documents attached hereto as Exhibit 11 and incorporated herein by this reference. 
18. The allegations of the Plaintiffs }n paragraphs 15, 16, and 17 of their 
complaint, including the execution sale resulting in the alleged loss of equipment 
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which secures Capital City, arise from the action described in paragraphs 16 and 
17 above. 
19. At all times relevant to this action, Capital City has maintained ;:n<: 
still maintains a perfected security interest, pursuant to Article 9 of the Utah L'nif< r -
Commercial Code - Secured Transactions, in all equipment, machinery, and o:.k.-r 
personal property of Bagel Nosh according to the certified copy of the records .r : 
search of the State of Utah - Division of Uniform Commercial Code, a copy of /. r i r* 
is attached hereto as Exhibit 12 and incorporated herein by this reference. 
20. No authorized officer of Capital City or any person charged with •••» 
responsibility for administering the Bagel Nosh loan has at any time represented \J 
any person that Capital City did not have or does not have an interest in the equipment 
of Bagel Nosh. [Affidavit of M.A. Allem attached hereto as Exhibit 13 and incorpor•::• •: 
herein by this reference] 
21. The Note, Seftel Guaranty, Seftel Trust Deed, Landes Guaranty, Landes 
Trust Deed, and Loan Restructure Agreement are all in default due to inter <\kg. 
the failure of Bagel Nosh, Seftel, or Landes to make payments to Capital City wron 
due. [Affidavit of M.A. Allem (Exhibit 13)] 
22. The interests of the Utah State Tax Commission, if any, in the property 
of Seftel and Landes described in the Seftel Trust Deed and the Landes Trust Deed 
are by virtue of a warrant for delinquent tax dated January 19, 1984, a certified copy 
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 14 and incorporated herein by this reference, 
which warrant was entered February 3, 1984, in the Clerkfs Office of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, in Docket 185 at page 826 more than four years after recordation of both the 
Seftel Trust Deed and the Landes Trust Deed, inferior to the interests of Capital 
City. 
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23. The interests of Crossroads Plaza Associates, if any, in the property 
of Seftel and Landes described in the Seftel Tr^ist Deed and the Landes Trust Deed 
were alleged by Capital City based upon foreclosure reports (received from a title 
company) referencing a judgment entered February 5, 1985, in Case No. C85-2~>h 
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lakel County and recorded in Docket I'M 
at page 2223, but said judgment was only enterfed against Powder Hound, although 
both Seftel and Landes are co-defendants in that proceeding as previously discussed 
in paragraph 16 above, which judgment is nevertheless inferior to the interests uf 
Capital City. 
24. The interests of Young Electric Si^n Company, if any, in the property 
of Seftel and Landes described in the Seftel Trup>t Deed and the Landes Trust Deed 
were alleged by Capital City based upon foreclosure reports (received from a title 
company) referencing a judgment entered February 20, 1985, a certified copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit 15 and incorporate^ herein by this reference, in Case 
No. C85-0611 of the Third Judicial District Cour^ : of Salt Lake County and recorded 
in Docket 196 at page 350, but said judgment isj only entered against Sidney Seftel 
and which judgment was recorded more than four years after recordation of both 
the Seftel Trust Deed and the Landes Trust Deed! inferior to the interests of Capital 
City. 
25. The interests of Olympus Hills Shopjping Center, if any, in the property 
of Seftel and Landes described in the Seftel Trust Deed and the Landes Trust Deed 
were alleged by Capital City based upon foreclosure reports, but Olympus has no 
outstanding unpaid judgment against Seftel or Landes, currently outstanding according 
to the affidavit of Richard L. Skankey, its authorized partner, which affidavit is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 16 and incorporated herein by this reference. 
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ARGUMENT 
Based upon the material facts set forth herein, to which there is no genuine 
dispute, Capital City maintains that this entire proceeding, including both the Plaintiffs' 
causes and the counterclaims of Capital City, is ripe for complete disposition on 
summary judgment as a matter of law. Each of the Plaintiffs' causes of action ^ 
well as the counterclaim of Capital City are addressed in the following points. 
Point I 
CAPITAL CITY HAS NOT BREACHED ANY CONTRACT 
WITH PLAINTIFFS AS ALLEGED 
Plaintiffs' first cause of action in their complaint asserts that Capital City 
has breached the Guaranty Agreements between Capital City and the Plaintiffs due 
to the alleged acts and omissions of Capital City. Plaintiffs further assert that the 
alleged acts of Capital City are governed by the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
and constitute "an unjustifiable impairment of collateral" discharging Plaintiffs 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-606(l)(b)(1980). 
No provision of the guaranty agreements is cited to this Court by Plaintiffs. 
Indeed, none can be cited by Plaintiffs. To the contrary, the guaranties specifically 
provide that each Plaintiff unconditionally guarantees: 
[T]o Lender . . . the due and punctual payment when due, whether by 
acceleration or otherwise . . . of the principal of and interest on and 
all sums payable . . . with respect to the note of the Debtor . . .. 
Each Plaintiff as guarantor in the guaranty further: 
[G]rants to Lender full power, in its uncontrolled discretion and without 
notice . . . to deal in any manner with the liabilities and the collateral, 
including . . . [power]: 
(a) To modify or otherwise change any terms of all or any part 
of the liabilities or the rate of interest thereon . . . to grant 
any extension or renewal thereof . . . and to effect any release, 
compromise, or settlement with respect thereto: 
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* * * * * 
(d) To consent to the substitution, Exchange, or release of all or 
any part of the collateral . . .. 
* * * * * 
The obligations of the [Plaintiffs] hereunder 
discharged, or in any way affected, nor 
rights or recourse against Lender, by reason of any action Lender may 
shall not be released, 
shall the [Plaintiffs] have any 
take or omit to take under the foregoing polwers. (emphasis added). 
Consequently, even if Plaintiffs could establish the allegations of their complaint. 
Plaintiffs have failed to establish any breach bf the express contractual terms -,i 
their guaranties. Plaintiffs have expressly waived their rights by the terms and 
provisions of the guaranties if any existed. 
Plaintiffs' cause predicated upon the Utah Uniform Commercial Code is inapt. 
The Note explicitly provides, in the final paragraph thereof, that it is to be construed 
and enforced in accordance with applicable federal law pursuant to 13 C.F.R. §101.1(d). 
E.g., Ricks v. United States, 434 F.Supp. 1262,, 1267 (S.D.Ga. 1976). The identical 
SBA Form 148 Guaranty has been interpreted by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
which is controlling in this jurisdiction. 
In United States v. Lattauzio, 748 F.2d 55|9 (10th Cir. 1984), the Tenth Circuit 
held that the guarantors of a SBA loan had waived any defense to a commercially 
unreasonable sale by the contractual terms of the|SBA Form 148 unconditional guaranty 
even if they could find that they were entitled Ito that defense under the applicable 
federal law. In reaching its holding, the Court Referred to its prior ruling in United 
States v. Newton Livestock Auction Market, Inc.,| 336 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1964) where 
the Court stated: 
By the terms of the guaranty contracts SfeA could have made an entire 
release of the security for the loan and ptill have recovered from the 
guarantors. 
Id. at 677. 
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Since federal law applies, the provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code are inapplicable. Nevertheless, even if Utah law applied, the Plaintiffs are 
not entitled to assert a defense under Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-606 (1980). That section 
only applies to discharge a party to the instrument. See, Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-hii* 
(1980). See also, Uniform Commercial Code §3-606, Official Comment 1 (1^2). 
The unconditional guaranties are separate independent contracts between Capital 
City and the Plaintiffs and do not come within the statutory definition of instrument. 
See, Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-102 and §70A-3-104. See also, American Security Bank 
v. Carno, 38 U.C.C.R. 1318, 1323, 151 Cal.App.3d 874, 199 Cal.Rptr. 127 (1984). 
Even if Utah law were applicable, Capital City would not have a duty to liquidate 
the collateral before proceeding on the Note. The Utah Supreme Court has 
unequivocally established that the "one action rule,? does not apply to personal proper!. 
such as the collateral in this case and expressly permits a secured party to proceed 
with suit on the obligation without liquidation of the collateral. In Kennedy v. Bank 
of Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881 (Utah 1979) the Court held that a creditor "has an option 
to pursue any of the parties liable on this note, which is secured solely by personal 
property, and may also, at its option, ignore that security and satisfy its judgment 
from other property in the hands of the judgment debtor." _Id. at 884. 
The consent in the guaranty agreements under Utah law also constitutes an 
explicit written waiver of any defense which Plaintiffs might be able to assert even 
if the allegations of their complaint could be proved. The Utah Supreme Court 
addressed a waiver of the impairment defense in guaranty Agreements in Continental 
3ank and Trust Co. v. Utah Security Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1985) where 
the Court upheld the waiver by the guarantors and in affirming the trial court stated: 
We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the language in 
the guaranty agreements is unambiguous and susceptible of only one 
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interpretation: the guarantors explicitly waived any defense based on 
impairment of collateral, (emphasis added.) 
ML at 1098. 
Plaintiffs have failed to establish an actionable breach of contract claim ;n 
their complaint based upon either federal or I[Jtah law. Accordingly, Capital <'::•. 
is entitled to summary judgment dismissing witji prejudice the Plaintiffs' first a. o 
of action for breach of contract. 
Point H 
CAPITAL CITY HAS A PERFECTED SECURITY 
INTEREST IN THE COLLATERAL 
The Plaintiffs' second cause of action alleges that Capital City breached **s 
duty to perfect and maintain a security interest in the collateral. Capital City denies 
the allegations, maintains it has performed all of its obligations, and has a perfc te«: 
security interest in the collateral. This cause also appears to be predicated upon 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-606 (1980) which has been previously demonstrated to ^e 
inapplicable. Nevertheless,, for purposes of this motion, the allegations of the complaint 
are assumed to be true. 
First, as set forth in Point I of this memorandum, the applicable Tenth Circuit 
law (or even if Utah law were applied) establishes that under the terms of the 
guaranties, Capital City has no duty to perfect or maintain a security interest m 
the collateral since the guarantors have explicitly waived that defense. 
Second, it is established that Capital Cit^ currently has a perfected security 
interest in the collateral based upon the official records of the State of Utah - Division 
of Commercial Code directly contrary to the Plaintiffs1 allegations. (Exhibit 12) 
Third, no amendment of a financing statement is necessary, as asserted by 
Plaintiffs, when collateral is moved within the State of Utah. Both Park City and 
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Salt Lake City are within the State of Utah, ergo, a new financing statement was 
not required when the collateral was moved. See, Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-401 and 
§70A-9-103 (1980). See also, Inter Mountain Assoc, of Credit Men v. Villager, Inc., 
527 P.2d 664 (Utah 1974). 
Fourth, Capital City denies that it has, at any time, released the collateral 
and no release is filed with the Secretary of State, pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-9-406 (Supp. 1986). See Exhibit 12. The affidavit of the duly 
authorized officer of Capital City (Exhibit 10) states that no authorized officer or 
person charged with responsibility for the Bagel Nosh loan has ever represented that 
Capital City did not have rights in the collateral. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' allegations 
are based upon Unsupportable hearsay. 
Fifth, Plaintiffs have at all times been in ontrol of Bagel Nosh and Powcer 
Hound which entities had possession and control of the collateral including supervision 
of its movement. Plaintiffs have also had knowledge of the Crossroads Plaza legal 
proceeding which resulted in the execution sale (since Plaintiffs are co-defendants 
therein) and failed to take any action to protect the interests of that entity but instead 
permitted a default judgment to be entered against Powder Hound. Any decline in 
value or loss of the property would be the direct result of their own negligence and 
not that of Capital City. It follows, therefore, that the Plaintiffs' cause for loss 
of the collateral is untenable, and Capital City is entitled to summary judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs' second claim with prejudice as a matter of law. 
Point HI 
PLAINTIFFS1 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM 
Plaintiffs' third cause of action entitled "Change of Principal Obligation'' avers 
that the March 30, 1983, Loan Restructure Agreement substantially modified the 
n6 
terms of the December 24, 1979, loan agreement discharging the Plaintffs, as 
guarantors, from their obligations. Plaintiffs do not allege that they did not have 
knowledge of the Loan Restructure Agreement nor can they. Sidney Seftel signed 
the document himself. Plaintiffs explicitly state in their complaint that they. .-i.> 
guarantors, made payments to Capital City pursuant to the terms of the Lo>in 
Restructure Agreement. Furthermore, Capital City maintains that the Plaintiff-
expressly consented to the modifications and all modifications benefited the Plaintiff-. 
The Loan Restructure Agreement was executed between Capital City, as Lender. 
and was signed by Sidney Seftel. Plaintiffs ar£ guarantors of the corporate Note. 
The terms of the guaranties, as cited in Point I, supra, at page 8 of this memorandum 
explicitly grant Capital City authority "to modify or otherwise change any terms 
of all or any part" of the Note. Hence, an action cannot be asserted by Plaintiffs 
against Capital City since Plaintiffs have explicitly consented to the modifications 
in writing. 
The only two real modifications to the Nojte are paragraph 7 and 8 of the Loan 
Restructure Agreement. Those two provisions: (1) reduce the monthly payment required 
under the Note from $5,557.50 per month to $4,000.00 per month, with certain 
exceptions, for a period of one year; and (2) reduce the interest rate by one-half of 
one percent. Both of those modifications benefited the guarantors since at the time 
of the modification the Note and both guaranties were in default (see Affidavit of 
M.A. Allem, Exhibit 13). Consequently, the guarantors averted collection of the 
Note from them pursuant to their guaranties in light of the Loan Restructure 
Agreement. 
Plaintiffs have provided no legal basis to support their third cause of action. 
The cause appears to be predicated upon Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-606 (1980) as were 
Plaintiffs1 first and second causes but that the impairment results from modification 
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of the Note by the Loan Restructure Agreement. As previously set forth, any 
impairment claim has been expressly waived by the terms of the guaranties. United 
States v. Lattauzio, supra. See also, Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Utah Security 
Mortgage, Inc., supra. 
Without any legal basis to support Plaintiffs third cause of action and in li^ht 
of Plaintiffs' express written waiver in their guaranties, Capital City is entitled to 
summary judgment with prejudice against Plaintiffs, dismissing their third cause 
of action. 
Point IV 
PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY 
WAIVER, LACHES, AND ESTOPPEL 
The Plaintiffs allege three causes of action. The first cause is predicated 
upon the alleged loss or impairment of collateral about February 1985. The second 
cause is similar to the first but alleges reckless loss of the security interest about 
February 1985. The basis for the third cause (the alleged change of the principal 
obligation) is the Loan Restructure Agreement executed March 30, 1983. As set 
forth in the affidavit of M.A. Allem, (Exhibit 13) no action, either formally or 
informally, was taken by the Plaintiffs complaining of the conduct of Capital City 
until the filing of the complaint in this action. The Plaintiffs, as Guarantors, made 
payments to Capital City from November 29, 1984, through December 27, 1985, on 
the Note of Bagel Nosh to Capital City in the sums specified in the Loan Restructure 
Agreement. All of the Plaintiffs' payments on the Note were after the occurrence 
of all of the events which form the basis of the Plaintiffs' three causes of action. 
Assuming arguendo the allged facts of the Plaintiffs' complaint to be true for purposes 
of this motion, their claims are barred by waiver, laches, and estoppel. 
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A Waiver is the intentional relinquishment pf a known right. To constitute 
a waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. It must 
be distinctly made, although it may be express or implied . . . . To 
constitute waiver, one's actions or conduct must be distinctly made, 
must evince in some unequivocal mannerj an intent to waive and must 
be inconsistent with any other intent. 
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 198J3) (citations omitted). In addition to 
the explicit written consent in the guaranty agreements which constitutes a waiver 
(discussed at Point I), the admitted conduct oi the Plaintiffs in making payments 
on their obligations as guarantors following the default of Bagel Nosh and after each 
of the alleged actions for which Plaintiffs now Iplaim entitlement to relief evidences 
clear and unequivocal conduct constituting a waiver of those rights, if any exist. 
[Ljaches is contingent upon the establishment of two elements: (1) the 
lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff, and (2) an injury to defendant 
owing to such lack of diligence. 
Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1|980) (citations omitted). The facts 
establish that Capital City has established both |of the requisite elements of a laches 
defense. Plaintiffs have not acted diligentlyl in pursuing their rights, if any. 
Furthermore, since Plaintiffs are the principals, officers, and directors of Bagel Nosh 
and Powder Hound, they were aware of all the facts but failed to pursue any action 
either formally or even informally against Capital City. In short, the Plaintiffs' 
predicament directly results from the default oi the corporations which they manage 
and control and not from the actions of Capital Ci^y. 
Even if equipment was sold at execution sale, the Plaintiffs, as officers of 
Bagel Nosh and Powder Hound, could have directed Bagel Nosh, the Debtor, to pursue 
an action in Bankruptcy Court for the recovery <^f the equipment since it would have 
been seized and sold in violation of the automatic stay of the Bankrupty Code (li 
U.S.C. §362). See, United States v. Whiting Pocjls, 462 U.S. 198, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 
n6 
L.Ed.2d 515 (1983); and In re Riding, 44 B.R. 846 (Bkrtcy.D.Utah 1984). Capital City 
does not have standing in Bankruptcy Court to assert that action. Hence, Capital 
City is prejudiced by the Plaintiffs' inaction and its own inability to pursue an action 
resulting from the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. §362. 
Finally, the conduct and actions of the Plaintiffs establish an estoppel 'o 
Plaintiffs1 claims against Capital City. 
The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by his acts, 
representations, or conduct, or by his silence when he ought to speak, 
induces another to believe certain facts exist and such other relies 
thereon to his detriment. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs have conducted all of the affairs of Bagel Nosh and Powder Hound 
and, thus, were aware of all operations of Bagel Nosh and Powder Hound inducing 
the legal suits which were pending. Plaintiffs in their corporate capacities .w.?re 
responsible for the equipment and executed legal documents on behalf of the corporate 
entities. Plaintiffs knew of the March 30, 1983, Loan Restructure Agreement. In 
fact, one of the Plaintiffs, Sidney Seftel, signed the Loan Restructure Agreement. 
Sidney Seftel represented that the Plaintiffs consented to the modifications and would 
continue to guaranty the Note including providing personal financial statements. 
In addition, Plaintiffs allege in their complaint, that they have personally been paying 
for over one year on the obligations to Capital City pursuant to the terms of the 
Loan Restructure Agreement thereby benefiting therefrom. Certainly, Plaintiffs, 
having enjoyed the benefits, cannot now assert lack of knowledge and by their conduct 
have ratified terms of the Loan Restructure Agreement. Nor can Plaintiffs lay fault 
at the door of Capital City for any alleged loss of equipment when Plaintiffs have 
controlled all of the corporate entities, were privy to all agreements and legal 
proceedings, and have had sole ability, due to the bankruptcy, to enforce rights m 
n6 
the equipment. Capital City has relied upon t\\e acts, conduct, and representations 
of the Plaintiffs to its detriment. Accordingly* plaintiffs are estopped from asserting 
their claims against Capital City even if th^y coi|ld establish each and every allegation 
of their complaint which Capital City denies. Qonsequently, Capital City is entitled 
to summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' causes of action with prejudice as 
being barred by waiver, laches, and estoppel' 
Poir*v 
CAPITAL CITY IS ENflTLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON IT0 COUNTERCLAIM 
Plaintiffs admit that the Note, Seftel Guaranty, Seftel Trust Deed, Landes 
Guaranty, and Landes Trust Deed are all genuine, Those instruments are all in default 
as established by the Affidavit of M.A. Allem. (exhibit 13) Consequently, Capital 
City is entitled to Summary Judgment on its counterclaim against Seftel and Landes. 
for the balance due on the Note and foreclosing Capital Cityrs interest in the real 
property. Thus, Capital City need only address its motion against the other 
counterclaim defendants. 
The Seftel Trust Deed and Landes Trust D^ed were both executed on December 
24, 1979. The interest of the Utah State fax Commission by virtue of its tax warrant 
is inferior to the interests of Capital City since it was entered on February 3, 1984, 
more than four years subsequent to the recordation of the Seftel Trust Deed and 
j Landes Trust Deed. Furthermore, the Utah Stat|e Tax Commission (served on April 
3, 1986) has failed to file an answer or other responsive pleading in this proceeding. 
Therefore, it is proper for Summary Judgment to be granted against the Utah State 
Tax Commission declaring its rights to be inferipr to the interests of Capital City 
in the real property of Seftel and Landes. 
n6 
The interest of Crossroads Plaza Associates (hereinafter "Crossroads") was 
alleged by virtue of a judgment according to the foreclosure report received from 
a title company. Crossroads, however, does not have a judgment lien on the real 
property subject to either the Seftel Trust Deed or Landes Trust Deed since the 
judgment is only against Powder Hound (Exhibit 10). Hence, summary judgment may 
be granted declaring the interests, if any, of Crossroads to be inferior to the interests 
of Capital City. 
The interest of Young Electric Sign Company (hereinafter "YESCO") is by 
virtue of a default judgment against Sidney Seftel entered February 20, 1985, more 
than five years subsequent to recordation of the Seftel Trust Deed. Thus, the interest 
of YESCO in the real property subject to the Seftel Trust Deed is inferior to the 
interest of Capital City which is entitled to -immary judgment against YESCO 
declaring the rights of YESCO to be inferior to the interest of Capital City. YESCO 
has no interest in the real property subject to the Landes Trust Deed. Accordingly, 
this Court may grant summary judgment declaring the interest of YESCO, if any. 
subject to the Landes Trust Deed to be inferior to the interests of Capital City. 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. (hereinafter "Olympus"), does not currently 
have an outstanding judgment lien on the real property of either Seftel or Landes 
according to the affidavit of its authorized partner (Exhibit 16). Hence, Capital City 
is entitled to summary judgment declaring the interest of Olympus to be inferior 
to the interests of Capital City. 
Based upon the foregoing, Capital City is entitled to Summary Judgment against 
each of the three Plaintiffs for the balance owed plus interest, costs, and attorneys' 
fees and directing the Sheriff to execute upon the real property in order to foreclose 
the Seftel Trust Deed and the Landes Trust Deed, and declaring that the interests 
n6 
of the Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroads, YESCO, and Olympus are inferior 
to the interests of Capital City. 
CONCLUSION 
There being no genuine issues of material fact, Capital City is entitled n 
summary judgment against Plaintiffs on its counterclaim as prayed and is also entitled 
to summary judgment against Plaintiffs dismissing all of their causes of action again>t 
Capital City dismissing with prejudice. Capital City is also entitled to summary 
judgment declaring the interests of the Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroads. 
Olympus, and YESCO to be inferior to the interests of Capital City in the real property 
subject to the Seftel Trust Deed and the Landes Ttust Deed. 
Respectfully submitted this &- / day of July, 1986. 
WATKjSS & CAMPBELL 
^StevenlT. Waterman 
Attorneys for Capital City Bank 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the V ^ d a y of July, 1986, I served the foregoing 
Capital City Bank's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Exhibits to Capital City Bank's Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Surtimary Judgment upon the following 
by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed 
as follows: 
Daniel W. Jackson 
JACKSON <5c WILKINSON 
Arrow Press Square, Suite 200 
165 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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DANIEL W. JACKSON (163 3) 
JEFFREY W. WILKINSON (3754) 
JACKSON & WILKINSON 
Arrow Press Square, Suite 200 
165 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone (801) 328-1800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA 
SEFTEL, and MICHAEL LANDES ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs • ] 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, ] 
a Utah Corporation ] 
Defendant. ; 
1 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
I TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil NO. C86-1810 
1 1 
Plaintiffs by and through their counsel of record 
respectfully submit the following Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Defendant1 is Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF CONTESTED F^CTS 
1. Plaintiffs dispute paragraphs 6 and 8 of 
Defendant's Statement of Uncontested Facts, that Plaintiffs 
executed personal guaranties of the "N0te in favor of Capital 
City." In fact, the guaranty runs to both papital City and the 
SBA asfov coguarantors with the SBA acting as a participatory 
lender* iir the^loarain the amount of 90%. See Paragraph 11 of 
Affidavit of M.A. Allen. The guaranties are not in favor of 
Capital City, but is in favor of the SBA to the extent of 90% of 
the unpaid balance of the note. 
2. Plaintiffs dispute Paragraph 10 of Defendant's 
Statement of Uncontested Facts. Defendants omitted to provide 
the relevant language from the SBA Form 148 guarantee. More 
specifically, the final clause of the fifth full paragraph of 
the guaranty. That clause states: 
The obligations of the Undersigned hereunder, and the 
rights of Lender in the collateral, shall not be 
released, discharged or in any way affected, nor shall 
the Undersigned have any rights against Lender: by 
reason of the fact that any of the collateral may be in 
default at the time of acceptance thereof by Lender or 
later; nor by reason of the fact that a valid lien in 
any of the collateral may not be conveyed to, or 
created in favor of Lender; nor by reason of the fact 
that any of the collateral may be subject to equities 
or defenses or claims in favor of others or may be 
invalid or defective in any way; nor by reason of the 
fact that any of the Liabilities may be invalid for any 
reason whatsoever; nor by reason of the fact that the 
value of any of the collateral, or the financial 
condition of thd Debtor or of any obligor or guarantor 
of any of the collateral, may not have been correctly 
estimated or may have changed or may hereafter change; 
nor by reason of any deterioration, waste or loss by 
fire, theft, or otherwise of any of the collateral, 
unless such deterioration, waste or loss be caused by 
the willful act or willful failure to act of Lender. 
This clause provides that the obligation of the guarantors is 
discharged if deterioration, waste or loss of the collateral 
pledged to secure the indebtedness is caused by the willful acts 
or willful failure to act of Capital City. Plaintiffs have 
alleged, thatr the very cause of the loss op the collateral was 
through the willful and reckless acts of Capital City Bank which 
resulted in the loss of the collateral pledged. See paragraph 
25 of Plaintiffs1 Complaint. See also defendant's response to 
Plaintiffs1 Request for Admission No. 3, wherein the Defendant 
admits that it had actual notice that the Park City Bagel 
Restaurant on or about October 31, 1981 closed. 
3. Plaintiffs dispute paragraph 12 of Defendant's 
Statement of Uncontested Facts. Sidney S^ftel as an individual, 
was not a party to the Loan Restructure Agreement. Neither of 
the guarantors were parties to the Loan Restructure Agreement. 
The only parties to the Loan Restructure Agreement are Capital 
City and the Bagel Nosh. 
4. Plaintiffs dispute paragrapn 19 of Defendant's 
Statement of Uncontested Facts that Capital City has maintained 
a perfected security interest in all equipment, machinery and 
personal property of Bagel Nosh. In factf! most of the Bagel 
Nosh equipment was sold in February o? 1985 pursuant to a 
landlord's lien and is lost and beyond any recovery by the 
guarantors of Bagel Nosh. Capital City 4id not take any action 
to assert their superior claim over tl^ e Landlord to the 
equipment or to prevent the loss of the ecjuipment. Capital City 
willfully allowed the equipment to be lost, thus prejudicing the 
TV TV /"ITAT • — - » — 
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guarantors' rights. 
5. Plaintiffs dispute paragraph 20 of Defendant's 
Statement of Uncontested Facts. Agents of Capital City 
represented to agents of Crossroads Plaza, the Landlord that 
seized the equipment and sold it, prior to any sale, that 
Capital City did not have any interest in equipment at that 
location. 
6. Plaintiffs dispute paragraph 21 of Defendant's 
Statement of Uncontested Facts that the Note, Seftel Guaranty, 
Seftel Trust Deed, Landes Guaranty, Landes Trust Deed and Loan 
Restructure Agreement are all in default. Plaintiffs dispute 
that they have any obligation to Capital City Bank. On March 
30, 1983, a Loan Restructure Agreement was entered into which 
altered the terms of the original obligation. See Defendant's 
response to Request No. 10 of Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions. 
7. Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding 
liabilities under the Loan Restructure Agreement. Questions 
exist as to the parties to the Agreement, the materiality of the 
alteration of the obligations, and the effect of the Loan 
Restructure Agreement upon the prior guaranties. 
8. A genuine issue of material fact exists with 
regard to the real party in interest with the right to enforce 
4 
the SBA guaranties. Paragraph 11 of the Affidavit of M.A. Allen 
states that the SBA is a participatory lendler to the extent of 
90% of the unpaid balance. The SBA is the real party in interest 
to prosecute an action to enforce said guaranties. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUES OF FACT ARE PRESENT CONCERNING THE 
DEFENDANTS1 WILLFUL LOSS OF THE COLLATERAL 
Under applicable law, summary judgment may not be 
granted when it appears from the record and pleadings on file 
that any genuine issues of material fact exists in relation to 
any cause of action advanced by the party against which judgment 
is sought. In the present case, the Plaintiffs herein alleged 
that Defendant Capital City Bank has breached its contract with 
them by allowing certain collateral to be converted by a third 
party creditor. 
In defense of those allegation^ and in support of its 
motion for summary judgment, Defendant Capital argues that under 
the form of the guarantee that was initially executed by the 
Plaintiffs, they have expressly waived any defenses to a 
commercially unreasonable sale of the collateral which was 
pledged to secure the obligation. In addition, Defendant argues 
that the Utah Supreme Court has recognized the unilateral waiver 
by guarantors of an impairment of collateral defense. 
nrw/wav 
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The guarantee originally executed by the Plaintiffs 
contains extensive language concerning the waiver of certain 
rights by the guarantors. That language however is conditioned 
by the statement found in the fifth full paragraph which states: 
The obligations of the Undersigned hereunder, and the 
rights of Lender in the collateral, shall not be 
released, discharged or in any way affected, nor shall 
the Undersigned have any rights against Lender: by 
reason of the fact that any of the collateral may be in 
default at the time of acceptance thereof by Lender or 
later; nor by reason of the fact that a valid lien in 
any of the collateral may not be conveyed to, or 
created in favor of Lender; nor by reason of the fact 
that any of the collateral may be subject to equities 
or defenses or claims in favor of others or may be 
invalid or defective in any way; nor by reason of the 
fact that any of the Liabilities may be invalid for any 
reason whatsoever; nor by reason of the fact that the 
value of any of the collateral, or the financial 
condition of thd Debtor or of any obligor or guarantor 
of any of the collateral, may not hve been correctly 
estimated or may have changed or may hereafter change; 
nor by reason of any deterioration, waste or loss by 
fire, theft, or otherwise of any of the collateral, 
unless such deterioration, waste or loss be caused by 
the willful act or willful failure to act of Lender. 
The final clause of that paragraph provides that the 
obligation of the guarantors may be discharged or reduced if any 
deterioration, waste or loss of collateral pledged to secure the 
indebtedness is caused by the willful acts or willful failure to 
act of the Capital City Bank. In its memorandum in support of 
its motion for summary judgment, Defendant fails to acknowledge 
this distinction and the resulting limit on the guarantor's 
alleged waiver. 
£ 
In its complaint, Plaintiffs h^ve alleged that the 
willful failure of the Defendants to act has resulted in the 
entire loss of the collateral which wa£ originally pledged by 
the debtor to secure the indebtedness. Thp Defendant's willful 
failure to act includes but is not limited to its failure to 
contest or otherwise defend the collateral which it alleges it 
has a security interest in from the conversion of that property 
by the debtor's lessors. 
The willful failure of the Defen4ants to prevent the 
conversion of the collateral in question falls squarely within 
the "deterioration" clause of the guaranty agreement and is 
distinct from the lender's failure to perfect a lien on the 
collateral. In United States v. Abbruz^ese, 553 F.Supp. 11 
(E.D. Mich. 1982), the court presented a detailed explanation of 
the difference between the general waiver language found on SBA 
Form 148 which is relied upon by Defendants as the basis of this 
waiver argument and the deterioration clause]. As the court in 
Abbruzzese explained: 
A reasonable and harmonious reading of the guarantee as 
a whole suggests that the two clauses take their 
meaning from one another, that the former clause 
applies to the failure to perfect a lien, and that the 
latter be restricted to those occurrences of physical 
damage suggested by the words "<br loss by fire, theft 
or otherwise." Id. at 13. 
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In Abbruzzese, the court went on to rule that their 
interpretation of the guaranty language was consistent with the 
tenth circuit holding in the Joe Huston Tractor & Implement Co. 
v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 243 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1957) 
because the deterioration clause was not at issue in that case1 
See also United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 255 (6th Cir. 
1979) . 
However, the unique facts of the present case involving 
the total loss of the property by means of its conversion by the 
lender placea in issue the deterioration clause and genuine 
issues of material fact regarding the Defendants willful failure 
to act. Because the property in question has been lost by the 
Defendants willful failure to act additional questions of fact 
arise concerning the fair market value of the property and the 
resulting extent of the release or discharge of the guarantors. 
These questions of material fact render summary 
judgment inappropriate and require the denial of the Defendant's 
present motion. 
!ln Joe Huston Tractor & Implement Co. v. Securities Acceptance 
Corp., the Tenth Circuit held that a lender's failure to file a 
lien in accordance with state law, or collateral given as 
security for an unconditional guaranty, does not discharge the 
guarantor from liability on the guaranty. This position formed 
the basis of that court's holding in United States v. Newton 
Livestock Auction Market, Inc., 336 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1964) 
which is alleged by Defendants in support of their waiver 
argument. 
On March 30, 1983, the debtor, Bagel Nosh Intermountain 
Ltd. Inc., and the Defendant executed a loan agreement which 
materially changed the terms of the original obligation between 
those parties by extending the term of tt\e repayment of the loan 
by reducing the monthly payments. The Defendants have presented 
no evidence that the original guarantors consented to the 
alterations contained in the loan restructure agreement or 
subsequently executed new guarantee^ relating to the 
indebtedness.2 
Under the generally accepted view, a material 
alteration in the contract between the creditor and the 
principal made after the execution of the guarantee discharges 
the guarantor. See Federal Deposit Ins. (porp. v. Manion, 712 
F.2d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1983); Tomlin v. Ceres Corporation, 507 
F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1967); Sander v. D^ttmar, 118 F.2d 524 
(lOthe Cir. 1941); Depositors Trust Co. vH Hudson General Corp., 
485 F.Supp. 1355 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
2Paragraph 5 of the Restructure Agreement provides as a 
condition* to that agreement, that Sidney Seftel and Michael 
Landes personally guarantee the Bank's loan 
guarantees were ever executed by the P1J 
execution of this agreement. Utah Code 
that every promise to answer for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another shall be void unless 
to the borrower. No 
aintiffs following the 
lAnn. 25-5-4 requires 
some agreement, on 
note or memorandum thereof, in writing, subscribed by the party 
to be charged therewith. Therefore, 
obligations are discharged by the alteration of the original 
guarantee, they are not subsequently liable 
if the Plaintiffs' 
to the Defendant. 
The Defendants concede that an agreement materially 
altering the terms of the original contract with the debtor and 
the Defendant does not allege that the Plaintiffs, in their 
individual capacities consented to the Restructure Agreement. 
However they argue that the terms of the SBA Form 14 3 
expressly authorized them to modify or otherwise change any 
terms of all or any part of the note and therefore the 
Plaintiffs have(^fmplicitly) consented to the modifications. 
However when the two documents are viewed together (the 
original guarantee and the restructure agreement) they appear to 
be in direct conflict and cause an express ambiguity. 
Specifically, the SBA Form 148 which was executed by the 
Plaintiff jointly guarantees the Defendants and SBA as 
co-lenders. In fact, in the Affidavit of M.A. Allen, an 
executive vice-president of Capital City Bank, he states under 
oath that SBA is a participating lender in the loan of Capital 
City to Bagel Nosh to the extent of ninety percent (90%) of the 
outstanding loan balance. (See Affidavit M.A. Allen, para. 11 
which was attached to Defendants' Memorandum as Exhibit 13). 
Yet in contradiction to this fact, the loan restructure 
agreement is allegedly conditioned* upon the acceptance of its 
terms by the SBA and that subsequent personal guarantees will be 
executed by Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes in which each will 
AACW/mar 
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be personally liable for the future indebtedness to the Bank. 
If the Restructure Agreement is binding ^pon all parties, it 
constitutes a release and settlement of the guarantors' 
obligations under the original guarantee. This interpretation 
of the meaning and effect of that document is mandated by the 
rule of law that requires that the documents in question be 
strictly construed against the Defendant . See Depositors Trust 
Co, v. Hudson General Corp., 485 F.Supp. 1355, 1361 (E.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
The inherent ambiguities found in these documents and 
their relationship and effect • on each other create genuine 
issues of material fact which cannot be resolved through summary 
proceedings but rather require a full trial before a trier of 
fact. Therefore, the Defendants motion for summary judgment 
must be dismissed and the matter be allowed to go forward to 
trial. 
CAPITAL CITY HAS FAILED TO JOIN AN INDISPENSIBLE 
PARTY IN THE LITIGATION AND THEREFORE 
ITS COUNTERCLAIM MUST BE DISMISSED 
Defendant Capital City argues in Point V of its 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion tot Summary Judgment that 
because various instruments all in default, it is entitled to 
summary judgment on its counterclaim against Plaintiffs. The 
arguments presented above which detail the various questions of 
AACW/mar 
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fact and law which are in dispute regarding the parties1 
liability under the guaranties established that summary judgment 
is not appropriate in the present case. 
In addition to the various issues of material fact that 
exist, summary judgment should not be granted to the Defendants 
because they have failed to join an indispensible? party in their 
counterclaim. The Plaintiffs1 liability to Defendants if it 
exists at all would have to be based on the written guaranties 
which they executed of December of 1979. Those guaranties 
(copies of which are attached as Exhibit 4 and 6 to the 
Defendant's memorandum) show that Capital City and the SBA act 
as co-lenders or partners in the transaction in question. The 
existence of a joint action and an implicit partnership in the 
loarr in question is affirmed by M.A. Alleiv when- he explains in 
hid^depositiony submitted, iiv support of Defendants1 motion^ that 
the- SBA is a participating lender in the loan of Capital City to 
Bagel Nosh to the extent of ninety percent (90%) of the 
outstanding unpaid balance-(Affidavit M.A. Allen para. 11). 
Notwithstanding the fact that Capital City Bank and 
the SBA were co-lenders in relation to underlying obligation, 
the Defendant has brought this counterclaim in its name alone 
and is seeking a judgment from the Plaintiffs of the total 
balance due on the note and the right to foreclose its interest 
AACW/mar 
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in certain real property pledged by Plaintiffs. Courts 
universally hold that an individual partner may not sue in his 
own name to enforce a liability owed to 4 partnership* and one 
partner's failure to join all partners ^s plaintiffs is grounds 
for dismissal as lack of necessary parties under Rule 19(a) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 
1984). 
The requirements of Rule 19(a) seek to protect the 
interest of judicial economy and fairness to the party 
litigants. By requiring joinder of nebessary parties, Rule 
19(a) protects the interest of the parties who are present by 
precluding multiple litigation and contaty claims over the same 
subject matter as the original litigation. See Kemp v. Murray, 
680 P.2d 760; Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeri^) Ltd. v. Ashland Oil; 
456 F.Supp. 831, 836 (D. Del. 1978). 
If the guarantees are enforceable, the Plaintiffs would 
be liable to both the Defendant and the SBA for a portion of the 
principal amount of the loan. Where rights sued upon arise from 
a contract, such as the guarantee agreements, all parties to the 
contract must be joined. Japan Petroleum Ccp. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. 
Ashland Oil, 456 F.Supp. at 836 footnote 7. In the present 
action the SBA, a co-obligee under the te:pis of the contract, 
has not been joined as a party by the Counterclaim Plainitff. 
AACW/mar 
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Because this indispensible party has not been joined the 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be denied and the 
counterclaim dismissed. 
COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFFS ARE LIMITED TO 
TEN PERCENT OF THE OUTSTANDING LIABILITY 
AND ANY RECOVERY MAY NOT EXCEED THAT AMOUNT 
In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant as 
counterclaim Plaintiff seeks an award of damages in the full 
amount of the balance due on the note. However, the evidence 
submitted by Defendant in support of its motion establishes that 
the SBA provided ninety percent (90%) of the- monies originally 
loaned to Bagel Noshr* pursuant to the note and that the 
guaranties which form the only basis for the alleged eprsonal 
liability of the Plaintiffs runs to both Capital Cities and the 
SBA. 
In a breach of contract action such as the prsent 
counterclaim, the purpose or objective in awarding damages is to 
fully recompense the non-breaching party for its losses 
sustained because of the breach. See Harris v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Inss. Co.
 f 683 P. 2d 440 (Idaho App. 1984). The insured 
party should be placed in a position no better and no worse than 
he would have occupied had the contract been performed. 
Christensen v. Christensen, 605 P.2d 80, 83 (Idaho 1979). 
14 
Adherence to these general! rules for assessing 
damages for breach of contract require that the counterclaim 
Defendnat may receive no more than ten percent (10%) of the 
unpaid balance of the note plus interest on that amount. 
CONCLUSION 
Capital City Bank is not the real party in interest 
unden the guaranties in question and must be denied summary 
judgment?/ 
Genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude 
the? entry of summary judgment, and Capital City Bank is not. 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law-; 
Dated this 2tfrt day of August, 198£. 
Daniel W. Jackson 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELlJERY 
I hereby certify that on the 2 " •>[day of August, 198 6, I 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of tljie foregoing document 
to: 
Steven Waterman 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Herschel J. Saperstein (2861) 
Steven T. Waterman (4164) 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant. Capital City Bank 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIStRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, ) 
and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, ) 
Defendant. ) 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah ) 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX ) 
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and ) 
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation, ) 
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited ) 
partnership, 
Counterclaim Defendants. MOT! 
Civil No. C86-1810 
(Judge Hanson) 
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Capital City Bank (hereinafter "Capital City"), by and through its counsel, 
Watkiss & Campbell, files this memorandum in reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and pursuant to leave < f 
this Court granted by the Honorable Scott Daniels pursuant to an Order dated October 
2, 1986, which also continued the hearing in this matter to October 27, 1986, at _': ;•> 
p.m. Plaintiffs (Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes) may be rerY--
to herein collectively as "Guarantors." 
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Capital City is the holder of all loan instruments relating to the Ba^*! 
Nosh loan including the Note executed by Bagel Nosh in favor of Capital City * 
December 24, 1979 (Exhibit 1 to Capital City's Memorandum), and the guar-inr. 
agreements of even date executed by each of the Guarantors. [Supplemental Aff:<vi-. * 
of M.A. Allem previously filed with this Court and a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 17] 
2. The Guarantors have admitted that they are personally liable on »**•* 
Note in favor of Capital City and that the guaranties have continuing effectiven^-
in the "Disclosure Statement by Proponents of the Reorganization Plan" dated Octob*•-
8, 1985, which includes the "Plan of Reorganization by Proponents" dated October 
8, 1985, which they have filed in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy proceeding and certified 
copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit 18. 
ARGUMENT 
The Guarantors are the only parties responding in writing to Capital O t \ ^ 
Motion for Summary Judgment. They assert that genuine issues of material fa«'t 
exist precluding the availability of summary judgment. The Guarantors1 memorand^H 
asserts three points comprising four issues which are: (1) factual issues exist relaf :•.* 
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to Capital City's willful loss of the collateral; (2) Modification of the Note discharged 
the Guarantors; (3) Capital City failed to join an indispensable party; and (4) Capital 
City's recovery should be limited to Capital CityT$ participation in the Note. Fach 
of the issues is addressed herein. 
POINT I 
THE GUARANTORS ADMIT THE CONTINUING 
VITALITY OF THEIR GUARANTIES 
The Guarantors have alleged that actions of Capital City on or about October 
31, 1981, and in February 1985, discharged their liabilities under the guarantiee 
However, the legal documents filed by the Guarantors in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy 
proceeding in referring to payment of Capital City explicity state that Capital Cit> 
will be "retaining the personal guarantors on the loan." See, Disclosure Statement 
by Proponents of the Reorganization Plan, p. 26 (attached as Exhibit 18). That 
document is dated October 8, 1985, and signed by counsel for the Guarantors. Thus. 
the liability has been expressly admitted or there hasl been an express waiver or consent 
to any modifications in addition to all other arguments previously advanced by Capital 
City. 
POINT n 
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FA0T EXISTS 
The Guarantors concede the applicability of federal law to this action. In 
order to ascertain if a genuine issue of material fact exists the law of the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals must be applied. 
To support their position, the Guarantors rely primarily upon dictum in United 
States v. Abbruzzese, 553 F.Supp. 11, 13 (E.D.Mich.1^82) interpreting the "deterioration 
clause" of the Form 148 guaranty. That Court states its opinion that its interpretation 
a24 
of the "deterioration clause" is consistent with the holding of the Tenth Circuit in 
Joe Heaston Tractor & Implement Co. v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 243 F.2d 19H 
(10th Cir. 1957) upon which case the Guarantors also rely. However, the Joe Heaston 
Tractor case did not deal with a Form 148 guaranty. Nor have the Guarantors cit*."i 
any authority where any court has ruled against the lender under a Form 148 guarantv. 
Furthermore, after the 1982 Abbruzzese opinion, the "deterioration clause." 
now relied upon by the Guarantors, has been interpreted by the Tenth Circuit earh»T 
this year in United States v. New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843 (10th i \r . 
1986). The Tenth Circuit stated: 
Therefore, in order to establish a 'willful act or willful failure to act,' 
by the [lender] under the guaranty agreement, a guarantor must allege 
more than 'gross neglect of a known duty.' A guarantor seeking to 
establish 'willfulness' under this guaranty agreement must allege 'a 
purpose by the [lender] to diminish the value of the security in order 
to intentionally injure the [guarantors].1 785 F.2d at 848 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
The Tenth Circuit's language is dispositive of this case. 
No allegation of the complaint alleges any purpose by Capital City "to diminish 
the value of the security in order to intentionally injure" the Guarantors. Indeed. 
any allegation of that nature is highly improbable since the alleged loss arises from 
execution on a default judgment against a corporation (in which the Guarantors are 
the principals) which judgment arose from a suit in which the Guarantors were 
co-defendants and who chose to answer the complaint on their own behalves but 
permitted a default judgment to be entered against their corporation. Having failed 
to set forth any allegations and provide any evidence of the "willfulness" requirement. 
summary judgment against the Guarantors is appropriate. Accordingly, the Guarantor's 
causes of action should be dismissed with prejudice. 
a24 
POINT ffl 
THE GUARANTORS EXPRESSLY CONSENTED TO 
MODIFICATION OF TH? NOTE 
The Guarantors persist in their assertion t|hat material modifications in the 
Note discharged their obligations although their Argument is in their memorandum 
under the heading relative to willful loss of the collateral. At page nine (9) of their 
memorandum, the Guarantors allege material alterations were made to the Note. 
including extension of the term, without the consent of the Guarantors. However. 
there was _NO extension of the terms of the loan. The alterations were a reduction 
of both the interest rate and the monthly payment. Further, on page ten (10) of their 
memorandum, the Guarantors suggest in a non-sen£ical phrase that Capital City has 
conceded some point and that there is no allegation that the Guarantors, in their 
individual capacities, consented to any alterations. 
To be clear, Capital City has not conceded anything. Further, Capital City 
reiterates its position stated in Point II at page fourteen (14) of its memorandum 
in support of its motion for summary judgment ftnd emphatically articulates that 
the Guarantors, in their individual capacities, expressly consented in the guaranty 
agreements to any and all modifications to the Note thereby waiving any and all rights 
which they might have been able to assert. 
Capital City also has provided additional information and argument which 
(as the Guarantors have recognized) supports a position that notwithstanding the 
express waiver there has been an implicit consent to the modifications or waiver 
of their rights. See also Point I, supra. 
Two of the cases cited by the Guarantors with reference to the alterations 
are inapposite. Sauder v. Dittmar, 118 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1941) is an old Tenth Circuit 
opinion which does not even deal with guaranties, Tomlin v. Ceres, 507 F.2d H4J 
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(5th Cir. 1975), states that a material alteration of the principal note will discharge 
a guarantor but does not address a specific waiver by the guarantor which is the issue 
in this case. 
The other two cases relied upon the Guarantors actually support the position 
of Capital City. In Depositors Trust Co. v. Hudson General Corp., 485 F.Supp. [Mi 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), the guaranty specifically required the lender to give notice to the 
guarantor of any modification and to obtain his consent thereto. The lender failed 
to give notice or obtain the guarantors consent. Thus, the guarantor was discharge 
of his liability. Notice is specifically and expressly waived in the guaranty agreements 
executed by the Guarantors and which are at issue before this Court. 
Finally, F.D.I.C. v. Manion, 712 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1983), involved a guaranty 
in which the guarantor expressly consented to codifications of the principal note 
but also provided a means for the guarantor to revoke his continuing guaranty. Ait^r 
revocation of the guaranty, the lender extended the Note and after default sought 
to recover from the guarantor. The Court's opinion acknowledges that a consent 
in the guaranty waives the guarantor's right to object to a modification or alteration. 
In that particular case the alteration occurred after revocation, effectively discharging 
the guarantor since the Court interpreted the waiver to apply only to extension - r 
modification of the Note prior to revocation of the guaranty. Implicit in the Seventh 
Circuit's reasoning is if the extension had occurred prior to revocation of the guaranty. 
the guarantor would have remained liable since the guaranty agreement waived the 
rights of the guarantor. 
In this case, the Guarantors have explicitly consented to the modifications. 
The guaranties state that the Guarantors grant: 
[T]o Lender full power, in its uncontrolled discretion and without notice 
. . . to deal in any manner with the liabilities and the collateral, including, 
but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following powers: 
a24 
(a) To modify or otherwise change any terms of all or any part 
of the liabilities or the rate of interest thereon . . . to grant 
any extension or renewal thereof . .I. and to effect any release, 
compromise, or settlement with respe|ct thereto. 
There is no provision in the guaranties for revocation as in the Manion case relied 
upon by the Guarantors. If the Manion court had been faced with the facts of thi> 
case, it is apparent that the guarantors would not have been discharged since the 
guaranty agreements provide an explicit consent to the modification of the Note 
without notice. 
POINT IV 
SBA IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY 
The Guarantors last two arguments are that the SBA is an indispensable party 
having a ninety percent (90%) interest in the Not|e and guaranties, and, therefore. 
Capital City's recovery should be limited to ten percent (10%) of the outstanding 
balance. Those arguments are meritless. 
The general law concerning a party in interest is not available in the context 
of negotiable instruments nor is the relationship between SBA and Capital City i 
partnership as the Guarantors assert. The holder df a negotiable instrument has the 
right to sue on the note regardless of actual dwnership. See, Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-3-301 (1980). The obligor under the instrument is protected when the holder 
of the instrument is paid since payment to the holder discharges the obligation. See, 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-603 (1980). In this case, Capital City is the holder of the 
legal instruments, is entitled to collect the Note (through suit or otherwise, and is 
entitled to recovery thereon. 
Furthermore, a participant to a loan is notj an indispensable party since its 
claims are only against the note holder (lead lender]) as to its pro rata portion of the 
proceeds and does not have a direct claim againsi the obligor. Hibernia National 
a24 
Bank v. F.D.I.C., 773 F.2d 1403, 1407 (10th Cir. 1984). The interest of SBA is not 
even a participation. SBA has agreed to participate in the loan to the extent of ninety 
percent (90%) of the outstanding debt when certain conditions are satisfied. The 
loan was fully funded by Capital City, and SBA has not yet purchased any portion 
of the debt. Consequently, the interest of SBA is only as a potential participant. 
and at this point, SBA is not entitled to any proceeds to be recovered. 
All parties necessary to a complete resolution of the issues before this Court 
have been joined. Capital City, as the holder of the instruments, is entitled to summary 
judgment for the full amount of the outstanding obligation plus applicable costs 
including attorneys' fees incurred. 
CONCLUSION 
Capital City has met its burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists under the applicable law. Accordingly, this case is ripe for summary 
judgment which should be entered in favor of Capital City and against each of the 
Counterclaim Defendants including Plaintiffs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 day of October, 1986. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
JSfevenT. Waterman 
Attorneys for Capital City Bank 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ->~- day of October, 1986, I served the foregoing 
Capital City Bank?s Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment upon the following, by depositing copies thereot in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as shown below: 
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